407 BAT  YE’OR & ISLAM

Towards the end of his life the great French philosopher René Girard, declared:  “We have to think about time in such a way that the Battle of Poitiers and the Crusades are much closer to us than the French Revolution and the industrialization of the Second Empire.”  I paid little attention to Islam until 1979 when the Iranian revolution launched an unending series of attacks on the West.  I certainly knew, as an historian, of the importance of the Battle Tours in 732 A.D., the First. Crusade’s recovery of the Holy Land in 1099, the defense of Vienna in 1683 and the Battle of Lepanto in 1571.  In all these momentous encounters Christian warriors repulsed Islamic invaders.  Yet, for whatever reasons, I had assumed the wars with Islam had ended.  Then came the Iranian revolution and unending Islamist attacks on Israel and the West.  It became increasingly apparent to me that Samuel P. Huntington rightly discerned the state of the world in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, wherein he argued that the coming conflicts would take place for cultural reasons.  We live in a “multipolar, multi-civilizational world” where conflicts ensue following religious revivals.  Soon thereafter came 9/11!  

On that day we all awakened to the severity of the Islamic threat, and one of the world’s most highly-acclaimed journalists, Oriana Fallaci, living in New York when the terrorists attacked the World Trade Towers, delivered a rhetorical bombast.  Her lengthy essay was released in an English translation—The Rage and The Pride (New York:  Rizzoli, c. 2002).  What she wanted readers to realize is that the attack on America was simply a small segment of a large-scale attack upon the West.  There is a world-wide Jihad—what she calls a “reverse crusade”— taking place, and the terrorists who murder innocent women and children are supported by literally millions of “extremist” Muslims who fully endorse their attacks.  Fallaci had interviewed both Yasar Arafat, the Palestinian who trained large numbers of terrorists, and the Iranian Ayatolla Khomeini.  She understood  the fanatical hatred that sustains radical Muslims.  The words of an Islamic cleric, attending an “inter-faith” meeting at the Vatican in 1999, summed up their strategy:  “By means of your democracy we shall invade you,” he said; “by means of our religion we shall dominate you” (p. 98).   Sadly enough, Fallaci had little hope that Europeans would regain their courage and resist the Muslim assault.  She had to flee her native Florence because local authorities refused to enforce even minimal restrictions on the Muslims who demand social services while trashing the city.  She asserted that “the suicide of Europe” (p. 185) was visibly transpiring.  Islam is in fact deeply antagonistic to Christianity.   Multitudes of Muslims today hate the West while suicidal terrorists act out their animosities and elicit applause from millions of their supporters. 

Refusing to remain silent while Muslims advance their cause—Islamic jihad—Bat Ye’or (an Egyptian scholar living in Switzerland writing under a pseudonym to help shelter her from the violence automatically addressed toward writers who dare criticize Islam) has, for decades, explored the somber reality of dhimmitude—the status of non-Muslims in Islamic societies.  She showed how Christians suffered under Islamic rule in The Decline of Eastern Christianity Under Islam:  From Jihad to Dhimmitude (Cranbury, NJ:  Associated University Presses, c. 1996).   She disproved many of the assumptions regarding Islam.  Too many historians, many of them subsidized by Arab regimes, have provided misleading “interpretations relating to the dhimmis, which were either tendentious or combined with facts with apologetics and fantasy.”  There is today an alliance between left-wing intellectuals and Muslims misleading the public.  But the truth needs telling, for Jihad is a sacred duty for the faithful.  Unlike the “spiritual” combat imagined by some pro-Islamic writers, jihad  advocates “a real military war of conquest” followed by an iron-handed “dhimmitude,” the reduction of conquered peoples to Islamic law.  Muslims divide the world into two—and only two—realms:  the “domain of Islam” and “the domain of war” (p. 19).  At times, strategy dictates tactical concessions and “peaceful” interludes.  But ultimately, Muslims are committed to conquer and control as much of the globe as possible. 

With Bat Ye’or’s treatise, we enter into a carefully crafted description of what actually happened to non-Muslim peoples under the yoke of Islam—a subject heretofore distinguished by a paucity of reliable studies.  She meticulously defined jihad, noting that it may be waged through both overt war and more covert means:  “proselytism, propaganda, and corruption” (p. 40).  Anything necessary for Muslims to conquer and control lands and non-Muslim peoples finds justification as jihad.  Thus motivated, Muslims established an enormous empire by the 800 A.D., established rather frequently by warriors who were brutal and booty-hungry pillagers, driven more by greed than holy zeal.  

So too, when Muslims ruled a region, reducing all non-Muslims to dhimmitude, they exploited and oppressed (especially through onerous, discriminatory taxation) their subjects.  Forcibly occupying highly-civilized realms such as Egypt, Muslim rulers slowly and surely reduced them to wastelands, economically and culturally depressed shadows of ancient glory.  Everywhere the Muslims went, there resulted “the agricultural decline, the abandonment of villages and fields, and the gradual desertification of provinces—densely populated and fertile during the pre-Islamic period” (p. 102).   Lands under Muslim rule were “administered by Islamic law for the benefit of Muslims and their descendents” (p. 70).  They impoverished conquered peoples, and even the much-vaunted “Islamic civilization” was second-hand, sucked out of dying corpses, not created.  “Islamic literature, science, art, philosophy, and jurisprudence,” Bat Ye’or says, “were born and developed not in Arabia, within an exclusively Arab and Muslim population, but in the midst of conquered peoples, feeding off their vigor and on the dying, bloodless body of dhimmitude” (p. 128).  

Theoretically, Jews and Christians had religious freedom, but in fact “at no period in history was it respected” (p. 88).  Theoretically, conversions to Islam were to be voluntary.  In fact, massacres, torture, slavery and intimidation punctuated the process.  In Spain, two centuries after occupation, “Seville and its surrounding areas were drenched in blood by the massacre of thousands of Spaniards—Christians and Jews.  To understand the much-maligned Christian Crusades, one must see them as defensive, just wars designed to relieve the suffering of oppressed and enslaved believers.  Centuries later, the 1915 “tenocide of the Armenians” showed the same jihadist mentality at work.  In short, Bat Ye’or says, “irrefutable historical and archaeological sources confirm” that the “process of Islamization” in conquered lands “was perhaps the greatest plundering enterprise in history” (p. 101).  

Reading Bat Ye’or’s book certainly sobers one!  She supports her presentation with extensive footnotes and 175 pages of illustrative documents, finding little admirable about Islam.  The weight of the evidence, the factual refutation of Arabophile histories, persuades one that the terrorists operating in the world today are hardly an aberration of Islam!

        * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

In Islam and Dhimmitude:  Where Civilizations Collide (Madison, N.J.:  Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, c. 2002), Bat Ye’or, provided historical documentation—ample appendices, notes, and bibliography—telling what happens to people whose lands fall prey to the sword of Islam.   She certainly brings a relentlessly critical, indeed hostile, approach to her subject, but she demonstrated a mastery of her sources and provides ample documentation for her assertions.  The story of dhimmitude began in Medina, as soon as Mohammed seized control of the settlement in 622 A.D.  He and the Jews of Khaybar made an agreement (a dhimma) whereby Jews were allowed to continue farming “their lands, but only as tenants; he demanded delivery of half their harvest and reserved the right to drive them out when he wished” (p. 37).  In return, he promised to provide military protection.  Thus was established the pattern of dhimmitude that endures to this day:  first there is a jihadist conquest, then taking booty and seizing land, and finally the abject subservience of all unbelievers to Islamic rule.  Dhimmi were forbidden to bear arms or own land or ride horses, and they were forced to wear distinctive clothing and pay extortionate taxes.  They were driven from the sacred soil of Arabia and were often reduced to slavery.  Indeed, Christian slaves, in places of influence, often mitigated the harsher aspects of dhimmitude.  Though Jews and Christians were technically “free” to worship, it was a tightly limited freedom, and in time great numbers of churches and synagogues’ were simply demolished.  

Bat Ye’or traced the pattern established in the 7th century as it was sustained over the next millennium.  At times the dhimmi managed to live in a somewhat satisfactory accord with their Muslim masters.  At other times there were intense persecutions (indeed genocidal attacks such as took place in Armenia a century ago) That made it almost intolerable for Jews and Christians to survive under Islamic rule.  “The Armenian tragedy,” she concludes,” is not an unique phenomenon; it belongs to an immense historical cycle of dhimmitude that still operates—in Lebanon, Sudan, in the war against Israel, and in other Muslim-Christian conflicts.  This cycle has its own characteristics, linked to the principles and values of the civilizations of jihad” (p. 374).  Following WWI, and the instability that ensued as a result of Europe’s policies, Arab nationalism (often attuned to Nazi propaganda) became both intense and vitriolic, especially regarding the Jews.  “Anti-Zionist terrorism was merely the modern version of jihad” (p. 173).  Nearly one million Jews were removed from Muslim lands in the Middle East following the founding of Israel in 1948.  

More than historically important, jihad, dhimmitude and shari’a are essential, unchanging components of Islam.   In southern Sudan in the 1980s some two million (largely Christian) people perished.  “Abduction, slavery, and forced Islamization of children . . . are similar to those mentioned in the historical records relating to jihad” (p. 206).  (Sadly enough, when details regarding slavery in Sudan came to light, neither the U.N., the Vatican, nor the World Council of Churches, dared criticize the Islamists ruling the country!)  To Bat Ye’or, “for all modern Islamists, the aim of jihad will always remain the expansion of Islam—by war or by persuasion—over the entire world, and the establishment worldwide of shari’a, the law of Allah.  The concept of dar al-harb embraces all non-Muslim countries; they constitute the empire of Evil and ignorance, the jahiliyya—the Arabic word used for the ‘paganism’ that preceded Islam.  It is the religious duty of Muslims to replace it with the empire of Good and of True Faith, which is Islam” (p. 218).  

Quite important in assisting jihad are the Europeans and Americans who champion the Muslim (and particularly the Palestinian) cause.  For some French politicians, the reason is economic, since Middle East oil sustains the modern industrial system.  For others, especially professors in prestigious Western universities who are  committed to “multiculturalism” and tolerance, siding with Islam is a mark of modern secularism.   In the process, they rewrite history in much the same fashion as Stalinists updated school textbooks to fit the Party line.  To an alarming extent the West has legitimized dhimmitude, establishing “at all levels a dissymmetry in respect of human rights, freedom of the press, of opinion and religion, as well as of democratic rights.  The reason is that dhimmitude is not recognized as a crucially important page of world history.  Hence the West has adopted the Islamic view of history, where dhimmi nations had no history, no culture, no existence.  Indeed, dhimmi peoples have neither a cause nor history.  They do not have the right to claim any reparations for the centuries of exile, deportations, spoilations, massacres and persecution.  They do not even have the right to speak of this” (p. 398).  

But speak of this Bat Ye’or does!  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In 2005 Bat Ye’or published, Eurabia:  The Euro-Arab Axis (Madison, N.J.:  Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, c. 2005) describing what’s taking place right now, particularly among the bureaucratic elites who increasingly control Europe.  She challenges readers to look clearly at the documents—many included as appendices to the text—that challenge the stories told by the largely pro-Islamic culture czars (the journalists and professors and politicians) in both Europe and America.  She’s clearly partisan in her presentation, finding little of value in Islam.  But she’s an enormously well-informed partisan, and her facts and perspective simply cannot be ignored by anyone seriously concerned with world affairs.  “This book,” she said, delineating her thesis, “describes Europe’s evolution from a Judeo-Christian civilization, with important post-Enlightenment secular elements, into a post-Judeo-Christian civilization that is subservient to the ideology of jihad and the Islamic powers that propagate it.  The new European civilization in the making can be called a ‘civilization of dhimmitude.’  The term dhimmitude comes from the Arabic word ‘dhimmi.’  It refers to subjugated, non-Muslim individuals or people that accept the restrictive and humiliating subordination to an ascendant Islamic power to avoid enslavement or death.  The entire Muslim world as we know it today is a product of this 1,3000 year-old jihad dynamic, whereby once thriving non-Muslim majority civilizations have been reduced to a state of dysfunctional dhimmitude.  Many have been completely Islamized and have disappeared.  Others remain as fossilized relics of the past, unable to evolve” (p. 9).  

“For well over a millennium,” Bat Ye’or continued, “following the seventh-century Muslim military offensives against Byzantium, European powers instinctively resisted jihad—militarily when necessary—to protect their independence.  The response of the post-Judeo-Christian Europe of the late twentieth century has been radically different.  Europe, as reflected by the institutions of the EU, has abandoned resistance for dhimmitude, and independence for integration with the Islamic world of North Africa and the Middle East.  The three most apparent symptoms of this fundamental change in European policy are officially sponsored anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism/anti-Zionism and ‘Palestinianism’” (p. 10).  The targets may change, but Muslim objectives and strategies remain constant:  “Hostage taking, ritual throat slitting, the killing of infidels and Muslim apostates are lawful, carefully described, and highly praised jihad tactics recorded, over the centuries, in countless legal treatises on jihad” (p. 159).  

The French have pioneered the current process of accommodation.  Charles de Gaulle, whose pride was injured by his exclusion from the Yalta Conference as WWII ended, and who witnessed the demise of France’s colonial empire, determined to create a French-led alliance of Mediterranean states that would effectively counteract the growth of American power.  His successors hoped France would become the “protector of Islam and Palestinians against America and Israel.  They hoped that a pro-French Islam would facilitate the quiet control of former colonies within the French orbit and spread French culture,” ultimately establishing “an enormous market” that would restore France’s former glory (p. 148).  The unsuccessful Egyptian-Syrian assault on Israel and the Arab oil embargo in 1973 accelerated such developments.  Europeans abruptly began discussing and defending the “Palestinian people,” a new name for Arabs living in the disputed region between Israel and Jordan.  The nation of Israel, which had enjoyed Europe’s support for 25 years, suddenly became the bete noir of the Middle East.  Hungry for oil, Europe began to support the Muslim dictators who supplied it.  Needing workers during that era of economic expansion, immigrants from North Africa and Turkey were encouraged to relocate.  

In the midst of all this, innumerable conferences were held and papers published as part of the EAD (“Europe-Arab Dialogue”) regarding the new coalition.  Bat Ye’or seems to have read every report of every such conference, and she takes seriously their wording, for they seem to have slowly shaped EU policies.  At such gatherings, attended by Arab and European elites, impressive words were uttered regarding human rights, religious rights, women’s rights, workers’ rights, etc.  And the Muslim workers flooding Europe have enjoyed such “rights.”  Still more:  they have secured special privileges and protections under the auspices of the increasingly powerful European Union.  This was, of course, a one-way process.  Arabs, for instance, demand absolute respect for Islam in European lands but continue to persecute Jews and Christians wherever Islam (with its Shari’a) reigns.  Muslims even insist that Islam rather than Christianity be recognized as the primary “civilization”—indeed “the spiritual and scientific fountainhead of Europe” (p. 98).  Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary, actually said that “Islamic art, science and philosophy,” along with Greek and Roman culture, had helped shape England (p. 172)!  A fantasyland of Muslim rule in Medieval Spain—“the Andalusian utopia”—is routinely cited as evidence of past Islamic tolerance and educational sophistication.  And, as the recent draft of a EU constitution indicates, Muslim influence grows.  Arab delegates to various EAD sessions ever demand that Europe’s schools and textbooks favorably portray Muslims and Islamic history, whereas Jews and Christians are routinely demonized by Muslim educators.  “Through the ‘Diaglogue,’’ Bat Ye’or insists, “Arab League politicians and economists have gained a firm ascendancy over Europe’s policy and economy” (p. 123).  

Multiplied billions of dollars have been extorted from Europe, sent as “aid” and “development funds” to Muslim countries—the dar al-islam world ruled by Shari’a.  “The huge sums that the EU pays to Arab Mediterranean countries and the Palestinians amount to another tribute exacted for its security within the dar al-sulh [i.e. the subservient state of dhimmitude].  Europe thereby put off the threat of a jihad aimed at the dar al-harb [the world Muslims are obligated to attack and control] by opting for appeasement and collusion with international terrorism—while blaming the increased world tensions on Israel and America so as to preserve its dar al-sulh position of subordinate collaboration, if not surrender, to the Islamists” (p. 77).  By supporting the economic and cultural policies Arabs demand, Europeans have, Bat Ye’or thinks, surrendered their lands and traditions.   By surrendering, they have become dhimmis, for “dhimmis do not fight.  Dhimmitude is based on peaceful surrender, subjection, tribute, and praise” (p. 204).  

When President Bush fought back, following the 9/11 attacks, subduing the Taliban in Afghanistan and invading Iraq, “the Anti-Americanism that had been simmering for years among European Arobophiles, neo-Nazis, Communists, and leftists in general” (p. 227) boiled over.  In a profound sense, Bat Ye’or says, such Anti-Americanism thrives in “cowardly or impotent societies, which have chosen surrender through fear of conflict” (p. 242).  It’s the resentment of the weak regarding the strong, “an intellectual totalitarianism disguised as a virtue for states which have entrusted their security to those who threaten them” (p. 242).   Still more:  “By implicitly enlisting in the Arab-Islamic jihad against Israel—under labels such as ‘peace and justice for Palestinians’—Europe has effectively jettisoned its values and undermined the roots of its own civilization.  It even struck a blow against worldwide Christianity, abandoning the Christians in Lebanon to massacres by Palestinians (1975-83), those of Sudan to jihad and slavery, and the Christians of the Islamic world to the persecutions mandated by the dhimma system” (p. 115).  Despite this, however, “the EU is implicitly abetting a worldwide subversion of Western values and freedoms, while attempting to protect itself from Islamic terrorism by denying that it even exists, or blaming it on scapegoats” (p. 227).  

In short:  with precious oil and prolific immigrants the Muslims have moved to impose a state of dhimmitude upon Europe.  Jihad is succeeding as Islam extends its sway—though oil has replaced the sword as the weapon of choice and immigrants rather than warriors serve of agents of occupation!  There’s a war going on in Europe, and Europeans have closed their eyes to preserve an “illusion of peace” (p. 252), much as they did while National Socialism and Communism devoured the continent in the 20th century.  

406. CHRISTOPHER DAWSON

One of my college history professors mentioned—almost in passing—that Arnold J. Toynbee was a prominent historian who had “put God back into history.”  Intrigued by his comment I proposed doing a directed study, reading and writing an analysis of  Toynbee’s A Study of History.  As a senior, I read the 10 volume work, finding it quite stimulating—especially insofar as it emphasized the importance of religion in history.  Indeed, Toynbee thought religions deeply influence the development of civilizations and are the only cultural achievements that survive the deaths of those civilizations.  Subsequently, in graduate school I fortuitously encountered the works of Christopher Dawson, who significantly shaped my understanding and subsequent teaching of Western Civilization as meaningful mainly as a manifestation of the Christian Culture that emerged in the Medieval World.  To Dawson, a providential perspective on the study of history was fully justified:  “Whatever else is obscure, it is certain that God is the Governor of the universe and behind the apparent disorder and confusion of history there is the creative action of divine law.”  Committed to this endeavor, he acknowledged that he “had to follow my own line of studies and plough a lone furrow for thirty-five years” because “the subject to which I have devoted myself—the study of Christian culture—has no place in education or in university studies” (p. 10).

In Sanctifying the World:  The Augustinian Life and Mind of Christopher Dawson (Front Royal, VA: Christendom Press, c. 2007), Bradley J. Birzer, a professor at Hillsdale College, provided us both a biographical study and intellectual analysis of one of the major 20th century thinkers, rightly praised by notables such as T.S. Eliot, C.S. Lewis, Etienne Gilson and Thomas Merton.  Standing beside them, witnessing the upheavals of the 20th century, alarmed at the “‘dark forces that have been chained by a thousand years of Christian civilization . . . have now been set free to conquer the world’” (p. 11), Dawson necessarily assumed the role of a “Jeremiah, prophesying lament and doom as the world followed down the paths of the various ideologues.  But he also played the role of the saint, using his considerable intellectual gifts to demonstrate the necessity of virtue and the light of the Logos to the modem world through his writing, his teaching, and his public speaking” (p. vii).

Born to a distinguished family in 1889 in a Welsh castle, Dawson grew up in a largely pre-mechanical rural world.  “Distrust of urban areas and masses of men would haunt Dawson for his entire life and greatly shape many of his views on culture, politics and society” (p. 20). Largely educated by private tutors, he learned much through exploring his family’s estate and extensive personal reading. Though reared Anglo-Catholic, he converted to Catholicism in 1914, having embraced an Augustinian philosophy of history while attending Oxford University.  Subsequently he devoted himself, for a decade, to the reading and note-taking necessary for “a writing career as a historian and general man of letters” (p. 28).  Properly prepared, he began publishing a profusion of articles and books—more than a 100 all told—designed to remind his readers of the formative role of Christianity in the making of European civilization.

  Though generally disinterested in academic appointments, he accepted (at the age of 69) a position at Harvard University as the first Chauncey Stillman Chair in Catholic Studies, where he taught for four years until poor health demanded his retirement.  Despite this university appointment, Dawson generally considered himself a writer committed to describing and explaining the role of Christianity in history. Thus, following his university years he joined a small circle of thinkers committed to “the Aristotelian/Thomist understanding of order” in society. They also embraced the position of “Edmund Burke, who had stressed the need for the ‘moral imagination’—the ability to see clearly beyond the here and now into the reality of eternal forms—thus allowing one to order one’s soul, one’s present community, and one’s soul to the eternal community” (p.  50).  Such order, as St. Augustine insisted, could come only as God’s grace restored a fallen world to its divine plan, and the Church was the agency called forth “to sanctify the world, and the individual person—if properly ordered in his soul—plays a vital role in the process of sanctification” (p. 57).  Deeply influenced by St. Augustine, Dawson found powerful parallels between the fifth and twentieth century worlds, so Aidan Nichols thought his “work is itself ‘best thought of as a latter-day City of God’” (p. 66).  Both men sought to affirm and advance classical, Christian culture amidst barbarian invasions—Vandals in Augustine’s fifth century world, secularized disciples of the French Revolution, the Deists and doubters and relativists in Dawson’s day.  Both did so with words, which they thought more powerful than swords or plows, rifles or computers. “With St. John, Dawson proclaimed the importance of the Word to the human person as well as to history and culture.  As ‘little words’—that is, human persons as imago Dei—humans pass on their civilization through the rational use of language” (p. 84).  During the 1930s, Dawson joined like-minded writers seeking to awaken the English to the

importance of religious faith and practice, contending that “‘the whole universe is, as it were, the shadow of God. and has its being in the contemplation or reflection of the Being of God’” (p. 110). He found in the Apostle John’s Logos theology the foundational truth that “Jesus ‘was not only the Christ, the Son of the living God; He was also the Divine Intelligence, the Principle of the order and intelligibility of the created world’” (p. 111).  Discerning His Light we may conform both ourselves and our world to Him.  Thinking thusly, he said:  “‘A Christian only has to be in order to change the world, for in that act of being there is contained all the mystery of the supernatural life’” (p. 112). During the same decade he spoke out against some of the pernicious ideologies that were enlisting enthusiasts for centralized bureaucratic systems, critiquing not only Stalin’s Soviet Communism and Hitler’s German National Socialism but FDR’s New Deal “as a constitutional dictatorship” (p. 124). Indeed, he thought: “‘It may be harder to resist a Totalitarian state which relies on free milk and birth-control clinics than one which relies on castor oil and concentration camps’” (p. 125). “The Europe of the 1930s, Dawson believed, faced the same fate as Republican Rome in 43 B.C.  It would either die, or it would remake itself under a centralized government.  In either case, it would never find any meaningful spiritual fulfillment” (p. 136). So it was time, as Pope Leo XIII had earlier declared, for the Church to “‘set up a wall and a bulwark to save human society from falling back into barbarism’” (p. 133). Northern Barbarism, of course, had been vanquished as Christians patiently shaped European Civilization during the Middle Ages.  Rooted in the cultures of Greece and Rome, Western Christian Culture preserved the best of antiquity.  As Germanic barbarians inundated the Roman Empire, monks and missionaries such as St. Boniface patiently led them both to Christ and civilization, “creating what we would now recognize as the beginnings of Europe, a synthesis of the classical, Christian, and Germanic” (p. 167). 

Equally important, medieval scholars such as Aquinas (best popularized by Dante) understood “grace as a ‘new spiritual principle which transforms and renews human nature by the communication of the Divine Life’” (p. 174).  This medieval synthesis began dissolving in the 14th century, first under assault from nominalist thinkers and nation states and subsequent (16th century) Protestant theologians and princes.  The leading 14 century nominalist, “William of Occam, according to Dawson, played one of the most important roles in the breakup of Christendom and in the growth of nationalism.  As ‘the leading mind of his age,’ Occam ‘was the initiator—the “venerable inceptor”—of the via modema [nominalism] which took the place of the classical scholasticism of the 13th century—the via antiqua—as the accepted doctrine of the universities for nearly two centuries, down to the time of Luther’” (p. 178).  To his theological nominalism Luther added a staunch nationalism which secured the unprecedented alliance between Church and State that tragically divided Europe into warring factions.

Those warring factions flared forth in World War II, a deeply distressing event to Dawson.  During and after the war he continued to write articles and books (best evident in what Birzer considers his best work, The Judgment of the Nations) pleading for a restoration of Western Christian Culture, heeding Pope Pius XII’s “call for a new Crusade, ‘to bring men back from the broken cisterns of national interest to the fountain of Divine justice’ and to promote a new and international understanding of the natural law” (p. 194).  The 20th century witnessed, Dawson wrote, “‘the unloosing of the powers of the abyss—the dark forces that have been chained by a thousand years of Christian civilization and which have been set free to conquer the world.’  Together, these dark forces have ‘the will to power.’  The darkest forces first emerged in the French Revolution and then re-emerged in the Soviet Union, spreading ‘westward, into the very heart of Europe’” (p. 199).  To do battle, Christians needed, above all, to employ the Sword of the Spirit, for only in His strength could battles and wars be won. 

Following the war, Dawson was honored by being asked to deliver the distinguished Gifford Lectures and appointed a professor at Harvard.  His erudition and insight were rewarded with highly public recognition and an enduring legacy.  Yet in many ways, he was an “oddity”—-immersed in Catholicism and committed to the Reality and role of God in His world.  Summing up this fine, exhaustively researched and documented study, Birzer said:  “He offered an Augustinian vision of culture and history to the twentieth century; he encouraged men and women to act like men and women in the best of the western tradition—through the virtue of love; he attacked the ideologues of the left and right as nothing more than false prophets promoting false religions and false gods; and, to revive the world through the imagination , he  promoted a new an vigorous understanding of the liberal arts. …. He desired to sanctify the world, through grace, to embrace truth, beauty, and goodness” (p. 271).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Gifford Lectures, devoted to the subject of Natural Theology, in some ways resemble the Nobel Prize for thinkers in the history and philosophy of religion.  So Christopher Dawson was honored to be invited to deliver the lectures in 1947.  He set forth an anthropological and sociological analysis later published under the title Religion and Culture (London: Sheed & Ward, 1948).  To explain his approach to Natural Theology he noted that until modern times it was simply a familiar aspect of Christian theology. Since the Renaissance, however, it has increasingly become a facet of humanism, with its scientific presumptions, rather than traditional faith-based reason. As an historian Dawson insisted we broaden our vision and take in the totality of human experience, acknowledging that from the beginning recorded history “we can never find a time or place where man was not conscious of the soul and of a divine power on which his life depended” (p. 41).  Rightly understood, “All religion is based on the recognition of a superhuman Reality of which man is somehow conscious and towards which he must in some way orientate his life.  The existence of the tremendous transcendent reality that we name GOD is the foundation of all religion in all ages and among all peoples” (p. 25).  Thus Natural Theology was rooted in the basic human awareness “that man has only to look out and to look up in order to see the manifest proofs of Divine power and wisdom” (p. 30). Discerning this Divine Reality, people developed cultures in accord with it.  Consequently,Dawson insists:  “Religion is the key of history” (p. 50).  “Religion and art are older than agriculture and industry.  In the beginning was the word, and man was a seer and an artist before he was a producer” (p. 132). Above all we are by nature homo religiosus, and “every great historic culture, viewed from within through the eyes of its members, represents a theogamy, a coming together of the divine and the human within the limits of a sacred tradition” (p. 54). Furthermore, “every culture, even the most primitive, seeks, like the old Roman civic religion, to establish a. jus divinum which will maintain the pax deorum, a religious order which will relate the life of the community to the transcendent powers that rule the universe. The way of life must be a way of the service of God” (p. 62).

Discerning the divine Design are prophets; propitiating the divine Power are priests; ordering society in accord with the divine Order are kings. “The Prophet is the organ of divine inspiration, the King is the organ of sacred power, but the Priest is the organ of knowledge—the master of sacred science” (p. 102).  With enormous erudition—an encyclopedic knowledge of human history—Dawson illustrated the importance of religion in vibrant cultures. In sum:  “It is the traditional teaching of Natural Theology that the elements of religious truth are common to the human race and accessible to every rational creature—that the Divine Being is the transcendent end towards which all the different ways of life converge and the divine law the universal norm by which all the different patterns of human behaviour can be co-ordinated” (p. 211).

Tragically, to Dawson, a “new scientific culture [that] is devoid of all positive spiritual content” has gained control of much of the world” (p. 214).  What emerged in the 20th century could hardly be considered a culture at all!  Given the tyrannies and bureaucracies and nihilism everywhere evident in the West following WWII, our culture “may become the enemy of human life itself” (p. 215). Consequently: “We are faced with a spiritual conflict of the most acute kind, a sort of social schizophrenia which dividesthe soul of society between a non-moral will to power served by inhuman techniques and a religious faith and a moral idealism which have no power to influence human life. There must be a return to unity—a spiritual integration of culture—if mankind is to survive” (p. 217).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The cultural integrity needed for mankind to survive was resplendently evident, Christopher Dawson argued, in the Christian Culture of the High Middle Ages. He articulated this case in one of his best books. Religion and the Rise of Western Culture (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1958; c. 1950 by Sheed & Ward), the second volume of his Gifford Lectures, delivered in the University of Edinburgh, 1948-1949.  He declared (citing Lord Acton) that “‘Religion is the key of history’” (p. 15). The energy and creativity that have distinguished the West can only be explained in light of a spiritual vigor “independent of political power or economic prosperity” (p. 18).

“The beginnings of Western culture,” Dawson said, “are to be found in the new spiritual community which arose from the ruins of the Roman Empire owing to the conversion of the Northern barbarians to the Christian faith” (p. 26). The missionary nature of Christianity shines forth in the patientwork of monks and priests, soldiers and scholars, slowly making Europe Christian. They did so not with the intent of civilizing barbarians or orchestrating “social progress, but with a tremendous message of divine judgment and divine salvation. . . .   Only by way of the Cross and by the grace of the crucified Redeemer was it possible for men to extricate themselves from the massa damnata of unregenerate humanity and escape from the wreckage of a doomed world” (p. 35).  Calling sinners to salvation, however, involved means whereby they could be sanctified. Thus liturgical worship and uplifting architecture and proper education were emphasized.

The men who made the West during the Medieval Era were mainly monks, doing the Opus Dei work of God) by daily reciting “the divine liturgy of prayer and psalmody” (p. 48). Through them “religion exercised a direct formative influence on the whole cultural development of these centuries” (p. 44).  Luminaries such as St. Boniface, the missionary “Apostle of Germany,” and Alcuin of York, who established Charlemagne’s school of the palace, bear witness to the grandeur of Medieval monks.  They were “the watchmen or guardians who ‘kept the walls’ of the Christian City and repelled the attacks of its spiritual enemies” (p. 45). In addition to praying the monks worked—oro et labore. “It was the disciplined and tireless labour of the monks which turned the tide of barbarism in Western Europe and brought back into cultivation the lands which had been deserted and depopulated in the age of the invasions” (p. 53).

While Irish and Benedictine monks effectively converted the barbarians and established the Church in the West, equally effective representatives of Byzantium converted Magyars and Bulgars and Slavs and others in the East, dealing with “a series of Asiatic barbarian empires, which constituted a continual threat to the Balkan provinces and the capital itself” (p. 104).  Especially important, radiating from Kiev following the conversion of Vladimir in 988, a vigorous Russian Orthodox community expanded and flourished. Indeed “the conversion of Russia opened a new channel by which Christian culture could penetrate the pagan North, so that the whole continent seemed about to become a Christian orbis terrarum” (p. 114). The Mongolian invasions, along with the Islamic Turks’ assault on Byzantium, profoundly thwarted this possibility, but successful missionary endeavors of both Eastern and Western Christians in the Middle Ages certainly laid the foundation for Europe.

However externally successful, the Church constantly needed internal reform. Monasteries lost their integrity, bishops neglected their calling, priests flaunted their vows, and princes violated the central precepts of God’s law. To read reformers, such as St. Odo of Cluny in the 10th century, the Church had lost her way and needed the radical renewal evident in the High Middle Ages—the feudal world of chivalry, cathedrals and crusades, of universities and mendicant monastic orders, of saints and scholars such as St. Francis ofAssisi and St. Thomas Aquinas. Dawson surveys and documents the rich cultural life of this Medieval world, arguing (much like Henry Adams in Mont St. Michel and Chartres) that it was one of the finest epochs in human history. “It finds an almost perfect literary expression in Dante’s epic, and it was embodied in visible form in the great French cathedrals. But, above all, it found supreme expression in the philosophic systems of the thirteenth century—those great ‘cathedrals of ideas’, as Professor Gilson has called them, in which all the acquisitions of Aristotle and Arabic science have been organically incorporated with the Christian tradition in an intelligible unity” (p. 197). And it was fueled by fervent religious faith—a faith. Henry Adams declared, more powerful than the 19th century’s electric dynamos. Inevitably, the rich cultural synthesis in the Medieval World declined and dissipated. Reforming.orders lost their zeal and wandered into the labyrinth of “ecclesiastical power politics” (p. 215). Scholasticism lost its intellectual resiliency amidst overly rational speculation and increasingly skeptical nominalism. “This tragic crisis of the medieval spirit,” Dawson says, “is reflected in the greatest literary achievement of that age, the Divina Commedia of Dante.  Nowhere can we find a more perfect expression of the power and the glory of the medieval cultural achievement which reached from Heaven to Hell and found room for all the knowledge and wisdom and all the suffering and aggressiveness of medieval humanity in its all-embracing vision of judgment. Yet at the same time it is a most drastic indictment of the medieval Church” (p. 216).

To Dawson, the grandeur of Western Culture—best displayed in the Medieval World—“is not to be found in the external order they created or attempted to create, but in the internal change they brought about in the soul of Western man—a change which can never be entirely undone except by the total negation or destruction of Western man himself”  (p. 224).  Most importantly, that world exemplified “moments of vital fusion between a living religion and a living culture are the creative events in history, in comparison with which all the external achievements in the political and economic orders are transitory and insignificant” (p.224).

###

405 John Polkinghorne

The most internationally-acclaimed person I’ve ever met was Sir John Polkinghorne.  Seventeen years ago I spent several days in Cambridge, England, sitting in on interviews with him conducted by my good friend Dean Nelson, who was writing a book on him.  In time Dean and Karl Giberson published Quantum Leap:  How John Polkinghorne Found God in Science and Religion (London:  Monarch Press, c. 2011; Kindle Edition).  They considered Polkinghorne “probably the most significant voice in this generation’s conversation about science and religion” (p. 7).  He was one of an elite group of mathematical physicists who discerned the reality of quarks and gluons—“the building blocks on which all physical reality is constructed” (p. 12).   His work led to his election to the Royal Society as well as being named a Knight by Queen Elizabeth.  

Quantam Leap is neither a standard biography—seeking to detail every aspect of Polkinghorne’s life—nor an academic evaluation of his works.  It is an engaging discussion of his effort to seek truth in both science and religion that ultimately points to the Reality of God.  Fusing interesting insights gathered in Nelson’s interviews with explanations of his writings (enriched by Giberson’s background in physics and philosophy), they provide a valuable treatise on an outstanding man.  It garnered high praise from one of the world’s finest astronomers, Owen Gingerich:  “Here is the revealing story of an influential Christian and brilliant physicist whose life trajectory has been astonishingly unexpected.  Written with sensitivity and clarity, this extraordinary spiritual biography of Revd John Polkinghorne illuminates one of the leading figures in our contemporary science and religion dialogue.”  And one of our era’s finest theologians, Alister McGrath, calls it:  “A very accessible guide to the life and thought of this leading thinker.  Immensely worthwhile reading for anyone concerned with the relation of faith and science.”

                                 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

John Polkinghorne delivered the Terry Lectures at Yale University in 1996.  Later published as Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven:  Yale University Press, c. 1998), these lectures serve as a handy introduction to Polkinghorne’s thought.  As he explained it:  “The book presents a series of variations on a fundamental theme:  if reality is generously and adequately construed, then knowledge will be seen to be one; if rationality is generously and adequately construed, then science and theology will be seen as partners in a common quest for understanding” (p. xiv).  We no longer live in the “Age of Reason” when absolute “certainty” regarding the essence of the physical or metaphysical world was proclaimed.  Rather:  “Amid the ruins of the Cartesian search for certainty, science and theology can proclaim, in their different ways, that there still can be found a reliable understanding of reality, verisimilitudinous rather than absolutely true, attained through the exercise of creative human powers rather than by logical deduction, backed by experience but not simply read out of it” (pp. 97-98).  Neither the absolutism of the Enlightenment nor the relativism of  Post-modernism suffices, for “there lies the critical realist approach to knowledge, ever open to correction but persuasive that its power to make sense of experience derives from its correlation with reality.   Both science and theology offer support to this middle ways of intellectual enquiry” (p. 98).  

To Polkinghorne, “the fundamental content of belief in God is that there is a Mind and a Purpose behind the history of the universe and that the One whose veiled presence is intimated in this way is worthy of worship and the ground of hope” (p. 1).  As a scientist who worked in fundamental physics, credited with playing a major role in the discovery of quarks and gluons, he is awed by the “wonderful order” of the universe that can be described in “elegant mathematical” theorems.  Mathematicians invariably talk about “discovering” the inner lineaments of the cosmos, more real and substantial than matter itself.  So to Roger Penrose, “’There is something absolute and “God given” about mathematical truth’” (p. 127).  “This use of abstract mathematics a technique of physical discovery points to a very deep fact about the nature of the universe that we inhabit, and to the remarkable conformity of our human minds to its patterning.  We live in a world whose physical fabric is endowed with transparent rational beauty” (p. 2).  Understanding this world, physicists like Einstein, “in making their great discoveries, were participating in an encounter with the divine” (p. 4).  Along with the fundamental realities examined by physicists are the equally important realities discerned by musicians and ethicists.  The beauty of Bach’s Mass in B Minor is as Real as the waves and particles of light.  Our inner awareness of moral obligations is as Real as the power of gravity.  The basic instinct to adore and worship is as Real as the bees’ desire for nectar.  We simply live in a rich and variegated world, with alternate ways of discerning its basic texture, within which, Polkinghorne insists:   “Theism presents an adequately rich basis for understanding the world in that it readily accommodates the many-layered character of a reality shot through with value” (p. 19).  

This leads him to a persuasive comparison between the ways scientists and theologians think.  Both begin with data, evidence, reports—physicists with phenomena such as apples falling from trees, theologians with credible descriptions of events such as Christ’s ministry and Resurrection.  Then comes an analysis of the data—whether Newton formulating the law of gravity or theologians such as St. John writing the great prologue to his Gospel.  Finally, there is a summarization, a scholarly consensus regarding what seems fundamentally true—the role of gravity in the formation of the universe, the decisions regarding the nature of Christ at the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon.  In view of this process, basic to both science and theology, Polkinghorne concludes:  “It does not trouble me that one cannot find articulated in the New Testament the developed Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation.  Instead one finds accounts of the foundational events and experiences that set the Church out on the road to the discovery of such doctrines, together with those brilliant provisional insights, such as the Pauline Lordship formula, which are the initial engagement with, but not the completion of, a seeking to come to terms with the new knowledge stemming from the new phenomena of Christ” (p. 37).  

In both science and theology Polkinghorne adopts the stance of a “critical realist.”  Whereas Immanuel Kant divorced the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, leading to a pervasive skepticism in many academic realms (dubbed a “Kantian fog” by Polkinghorne), working scientists cannot but assume their congruence.  Doing so requires a metaphysical decision that can be illustrated and defended through the successful endeavors of theoretical physicists:  there is a Real word whose inner essence may be described in mathematical terms.   That being so, there is no reason to discount reasonable inferences from what is empirically observed to non-empirical explanations of events.   Similarly, there is no necessary reason, if one allows the reality of a creative Mind, to exclude the possibility of miraculous processes or events, the Supernatural working within the natural.  As one of the elite corps of physicists who discovered quarks, Polkinghorne notes that they are “not only unseen” but utterly “invisible in principle.”  Traces of their activity may be discerned, “but not the entities themselves.  To borrow language from theology, we know the economic quark but not the immanent quark” (p. 122).    He declares:  “I am fully persuaded of the reality of the quark structure of matter.  I believe that it makes sense of physical experience precisely because it corresponds to what is the case.  A similar conviction grounds my belief in the invisible reality of God” (pp. 122-123).  

To answer the question “does God act in the physical world” Polkinghorne says “yes.”  But though “human beings act in the world through a combination of energetic physical causality and active information . . . God’s providential interaction with creation is purely through the top-down input of information” (pp. 71-72).  Minimally, one may hold that there is a higher power that preserves in being all that is, confining Him to a passive role in regards to creation.  But one may, with scientific respectability, affirm much more, for if one takes “the psychosomatic view of human nature” he advocates, “then God cannot interact with the psyche without also interacting with the physical process of the world, since we are embodied beings” (p. 55).  Still more:  “In unprecedented circumstances, it is entirely conceivable that God will act in totally novel and unexpected ways.  That is how I try to understand claims about divine miracles, a subject  . . . of central importance to a Christian thinker because of the pivotal role played in Christ’s resurrection’” (p. 73).  Since our soul is the “form” of our body, God cannot simply speak to our soul without simultaneously touching our body.  So exactly how God works within His world, precisely what kinds of causation may be accredited to Him, tantalizes Polkinghorne, but he believes, given some of the spectacular breakthroughs in quantum physics, that “an ontological openness, permitting us to suppose that a new causal principle may play a role in bringing about future developments” (p. 62).  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

John Polkinghorne refurbished many of his earlier positions in Quantum Physics and Theology:  An Unexpected Kinship (New Haven:  Yale University Press, c. 2007).  He stands, quite comfortably, with a foot in both camps, for he believes that “there are significant degrees of cousinly relationship between the ways in which science and theology conduct their truth-seeking enquiries into the nature of reality” (p. x).  Both scientists and theologians search for truth.  Thus they share a common goal:  discerning what really is, the ultimate nature of Reality.  It is amazing that man understands something of the Mind of God through scientific inquiry.  Indeed, “this remarkable human capacity for scientific discovery ultimately requires the insight that our power in this respect is the gift of the universe’s Creator who, in that ancient and powerful phrase, has made humanity in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27).   Through the exercise of this gift, those working in fundamental physics are able to discern a world of deep and beautiful order—a universe shot through with signs of mind” (p. 8).  

The world of physics is endlessly fascinating to Polkinghorne, but he also admits that scientific work “does not affect my life in any significant way outside the pursuit of intellectual satisfaction in the study or the laboratory.   In contrast, my belief that Jesus Christ is the incarnate Son of God has consequences for all aspects of my life, as much in relation to conduct as to understanding.  Religious belief is much more demanding than scientific belief—more costly and more ‘dangerous’, one might say” (p. 13).  The Mind—the Word—that shaped the Cosmos appeared in human form in Christ Jesus, and seeking the Truth as revealed in Him leads to three basic questions:  “(i) Was Jesus indeed resurrected on the third day, and if so, why was Jesus, alone among all humanity, raised from the dead within history to live an everlasting life of glory beyond history? (ii) Why did the first Christians feel driven to use divine-sounding language about the man Jesus?  (iii) What was the basis for the assurance felt by the first disciples that through the risen Christ they had been given a power that was transforming their lives in a new and unprecedented way?” (p. 31).  To answer these questions, to get at the truth revealed by Jesus, requires theological reasoning that is much akin to scientific reasoning.  You take the evidence as given, try to develop meaningful hypotheses, and then establish reasonable convictions.  Both scientific and theological understandings develop through time as thoughtful practitioners ponder the evidence.  “As in quantum theory, so in Christian theology, much greater significance came finally to be recognized than had been apparent at the start of the process of searching for truth” (p. 55).  Thus Polkinghorne carefully investigates the claims regarding Christ’s Resurrection, finding (along with his friend N. T. Wright) the New Testament accounts quite credible.  The tomb really was empty.  The miracle of miracles actually occurred.  

Given the great miracle, the second question that concerns Polkinghorne (why did early Christians make divine claims for the Christ) finds its answer.  Moved by the miracle, “the first generation of Christians produced three of the greatest figures [Paul; John; the author of Hebrews] ever in the history of theological thought.  Their brilliant insights have shaped the form of Christian theology in the manner that the believer will see as the result of providential inspiration by the Holy Spirit, guiding the use of individual human gifts” (p. 68).  Only the sheer factiticity of the Resurrection explains the intellectual profundity and power of the New Testament apostles.  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

For an easy introduction to the totality of John Polkinghorne’s work, it is advisable to pick up Questions of Truth:  Fifty-one Responses to Questions about God, Science, and Belief (Louisville:  Westminister John Knox Press, c. 2009), co-written by Polkinghorne and his good friend and former student, Nicholas Beale.  Tony Hewish, a Nobel Prizewinner in Physics, says (in the book’s affirming foreword) that he shares Polkinghorne’s view “that science and religion are not in conflict—they are, in fact, complementary, and both are vital for the deepest understanding of our place in the universe” (p. xi).  Both physicists and theologians believe in a very real world that proves ultimately most mysterious.  “The ghostly presence of virtual particles defies rational common sense and is nonintuitive for those unacquainted with physics.  Religious belief in God, and Christian belief that God became Man around two thousand years ago, may seem strange to common-sense thinking.  But when the most elementary physical things behave in this way, we should be prepared to accept that the deepest aspects of our existence go beyond our common-sense intuitions” (p. x).  

The first of the book’s seven sections, “Leading Questions,” sketches the issues to be addressed.  Central, of course, are questions regarding the relationship between science and religion.  Importantly, scientists do not deal singularly with “facts” while theologians toss off immaterial “opinions.”  The main difference between the two disciplines is this:  “Science is concerned with the question, How?—By what process do things happen?  Theology is concerned with the question, Why?—Is there a meaning and purpose behind what is happening?” (p. 7).  Both want to understand, in different but complementary ways, Ultimate Reality, and inasmuch as “science are both concerned with the search for truth, they are friends and not foes” (p. 8).  Questions concerning “The Concept and Existence of God” constitute the book’s second section.  Polkinghorne politely dismisses the atheistic polemics of the highly-acclaimed and acerbic biologist Richard Dawkins, whose The God Delusion primarily demonstrates his unwillingness to “seriously engage with the arguments for religion or the existence of God, and some of the points he makes are ludicrous” (p. 28).  Especially irritating to a professor of mathematical physics, it’s clear that along with “most biologists of his generation, Dawkins does not appear to be comfortable with detailed calculations” (p. 46).  Polkinghorne fully embraces the strangely paradoxical nature of the world of quantum physics, where quarks and gluons are believed to be real though perceived only indirectly, and where the bafflingly mysterious  “dark matter and dark energy” constitute  “over 90 percent of the universe”  (pp. 29-30).  To think, with popularizing atheists, that “’nothing can be true unless it is well-understood scientifically’ is ludicrous” (p. 30).  

Similarly, theologians speaking of God indirectly, often through analogies, may have equal credibility, for they are trying to understand, using different means, the same universe and its Maker.  Indeed, the ancient Christian conviction that God created (ex nihilo) all that is has received remarkable confirmation within the past 50 years from physicists positing the “Big Bang.”  Still more:  even the “intrinsic unpredictabilities of quantum mechanics and chaos theory can be seen theologically as gifts of a Creator whose creation is both orderly and open in this way” (p. 43).  Add to this the “fine tuning” of a universe that seems too intricately designed to be explained by sheer chance.  Physicists currently postulate six “fundamental constants” with “astonishingly accurate” parameters.  “As Tony Hewish once remarked, the accuracy of just one of these parameters is comparable to getting the mix of flour and sugar right to within one grain of sugar in a cake ten times the mass of the sun” (p. 44).  Perhaps it just happened!  More likely, it was carefully planned!  

That the universe reveals an “anthropic fine-tuning” key is discussed in the book’s first appendix, a more technical section wherein Polkinghorne assesses the mathematics embodied in the fundamental laws of nature.  When you consider the truly astronomical numbers involved, you should acknowledge that “if any of these numbers were appreciably different from their presently observed values, not only would there be no life on Earth but there would, as far as anyone can tell, be no prospect of intelligent life anywhere in the universe” (p. 101).  You are thus justified in believing that only a divine Mind could have called it into being.  In the second appendix, the brain-mind mystery is explored.  Polkinghorne takes seriously the biblical proclamation that we are made in God’s image.  The very fact that we can reason mathematically and understand many incredibly complex phenomena affirms the radically different status enjoyed by man, vis-a-vis the rest of creation.  He labels his position “dual-aspect monism,” but as I discussed this with him he acknowledged that there is probably little difference between his view and my own Thomistic dualism. What he believes is that “the brain is not a fully deterministic system” (p. 118).  There is a spiritual aspect—a mind—that transcends the mechanical functions of the brain.  The information (or the ideas taking form in art and music and ethics) in our minds cannot be reduced to material entities.  Unfortunately, we too often use mechanical metaphors when describing the world or explaining how we think, whereas we now know that “most of the real world is composed of systems that are cloudlike and inherently unpredictable” (p. 126).  So too the inner realm of our thoughts, wherein we find “finely balanced decisions taken in regions with highly connected neurons—that are required to support our fundamental experience of true free will” (p. 131).  

To get highly technical, but powerfully persuasive, Polkinghorne explains why our thoughts are not pre-determined by matter-in-motion:  “There are about 300 billion stars in our galaxy, but very few of them are in direct contact with each other.  But contrast, on average each of the 100 billion neurons in your brain is in direct contact with about 10,000 others.  Each connection differs in detail, and the exact biochemical and indeed quantum state of each neuron is different.  Thus in principle there are about 100 billion to the power of 10,000 different possible ways in which a single neuron could be connected to the rest of the brain, and even if we assume that in practice only 0.01 percent of the other neurons are eligible for connection, the number of possible interconnections for a single neuron would be around 107000, and for the brain as a whole there would be a set of possible interconnections of about 1011 to the power of 107000.  This, of course, is why the idea of genetic determinism of the brain is so absurd—there is not nearly enough information in the genome to specify such connections” (p. 134).  In view of what we now know about the intricacies of the brain, “it is now clear that we are not prisoners of our atoms, molecules or genes.  Our intuitions of freedom are real.  How we use this awesome gift from God is central to the question of what it means to be human” (p. 137).  In the third appendix Polkinghorne considers the question of evolution.  He regards the Bible’s creation account as a record of “deep truths, not a cookbook” (p. 139) dealing with the details of the creative process.  Thus he finds no problem, as a Christian theologian, accepting the general evolutionary account of modern science.  He compares evolution with gravity, a natural power that “influences everything in the universe—but is not the whole story of matter” (p. 141).  One need not be a devout Darwinian, too often given an atheistic edge in popular writings, to embrace an evolutionary process with a divine dimension.  

404 Thomas Oden

I found the Methodist theologian Thomas Oden helpful in understanding the shallowness of much modern theology and finding a deep compatibility between Wesleyan theology and the fathers of the Church.  One of the first books I reviewed for my “Reedings” was his After Modernity . . . What?  Agenda for Theology (Grand Rapids:  Academie Books, c. 1990).  Having discovered that both he and his “postcritical” students hungered for “the available power of the Christian heritage rather than trendy ideas of minor modern heretics” (p. 16), he called readers to recover their authentic Christian roots in the Ancient Church, for “it is from the martyrs, saints, and prophets of Christian history, more than from recent riskless interpreters, that we learn of the value of classical Christianity” (p. 13).

     In part one of the book, “The Courtship of Modernity,” Oden urged readers to reject many of our era’s most seductive proposals.  To do so means discounting “modernity,” which he described as “a narcissistic hedonism that assumes that moral value is reducible to now feelings and sensory experience” (p. 31).  Indeed:  “Narcissism is a key mark of modernity.  Myself becomes the central project of moral interest; self-enjoyment and self-development become the central goals” (p. 79).  Oden knew whereof he spoke!  In some deeply personal, confessional, passages he reflected on all the “movements” he had earlier joined and championed, only to find them short-lived and inconsequential.  Older and wiser, he found a profoundly satisfying rootage in classical orthodoxy, mainly located in the first five centuries of Church history.

     A major step on this journey was discovering biblical hermeneutics!  By learning to listen to the text itself, becoming obedient to it (not the latest scholar’s interpretation of it), he found what ‘was the most improbable and difficult and revolutionary thing that has ever happened to me’ (p. 80).  He discovered his real role as a theologian:  listening, along with the ancients, to the Bible.  Most modern thinkers cultivate novelty to celebrate their brilliance.  Rather than seeking to clarify and declare the ancient texts they covet acclaim.  During the last two centuries, “critical” scholars, have pretended to objectively deal with biblical materials, whereas they usually asserted, in religious terms, their peculiar generation’s prejudices, generally imposing a “naturalistic reductionism upon the New Testament texts” (p. 101).  Rejecting fashionable moderns and their cavalier treatment of ancient texts, Oden prefered Origen’s abiding confidence that the Holy Scriptures are not mere human productions, but rather written by humans under the “inspiration of the Holy Spirit,” scriptures subsequently “transmitted and entrusted to us by the Will of God.” 

     Having cut a wide swathe through modernity’s most treasured artifacts, Oden advocated ‘The Liberation of Orthodoxy.”  Long concerned with pastoral theology and praxis, he thought churchmen needed to stand strong against heresy.  If the church survives, transmitting its traditions from generation to generation, its teachers must conserve the treasury of the past.  So heresies must be forever highlighted and resisted.  In Oden’s view, heresy basically means “self-choice”—exalting one’s personal interpretation over that of the believing community.  Unlike heretical movements, orthodoxy conserves by continually asking “What in fact did the apostles teach?” (p. 162).   At the heart of orthodoxy one finds not static dogmas but the living Lord Jesus Christ.  At the heart of orthodox communities one finds believers loving the resurrected Christ.  This, above all else, the church must sustain. 

     Oden closed his treatise with a somber chapter entitled “the winter temperament.” To him the cultural landscape looked like a bombed out city.  All the fond aspirations of earlier times had failed and laid about like litter on an abandoned playground.  The hope that sustains him was what St Augustine discovered amidst the collapse of the Roman Empire:  the City of God!   And insofar as Oden finds firm foundations in the same faith which shored up Augustine, he reminded us that however unsettled our times may be there is something to rest upon.  For Oden, T.S. Eliot’s words (quoted by J.I. Packer in his foreword) suffice:  “We shall not cease from exploration / And the end of all our exploring/  Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time.”

                                       * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In A Change of Heart:  A Personal and Theological Memoir (Downers Grove, IL:  Inter/Varsity Press, c. 2014) Thomas Oden set forth a fascinating and illuminating reflection on his life and scholarly career.  Reading his story provides not only insight into Oden—it illuminates much about recent American history as well as amplifies timeless truths regarding the Christian Faith.  In brief, he confessed:  “My life story has had two phases: going away from home as far as I could go, not knowing what I might find in an odyssey of preparation, and then at last inhabiting anew my own original home of classic Christian wisdom.  The uniting theme of the two parts of my life can only be providence” (p. 140).  

Born in 1931 and reared in Altus, Oklahoma, Oden absorbed and still celebrates many aspects of the high plains frontier culture that nourished him.  Joining the Cub Scouts as a boy, Oden embraced their Motto:  “Do your best,” and “memorized the Scout law, which says ‘A Scout is trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean and reverent.’  These ideals have never been erased from my consciousness” (p. 20).  Devout members of the Altus Methodist church, his parents not only attended services but began each day with devotional readings from the “Upper Room” and said grace before meals.  As a zealous youngster, he “became maximally involved in the youth activities of the Epworth League for Methodist young people, where I received ever-expanding doses of social justice aspirations” (p. 31).  

Entering the University of Oklahoma in 1949, Oden qualified for a unique “Letters” program that enabled students to choose their course of studies in literature, history, and philosophy.  He read many of the “greats”—Shakespeare, Plato, et al.—but found himself most drawn to the Marxism and was “a Marxist utopian dreamer for a decade before I learned the vulnerabilities of Marxist theories” (p. 42).  He also decided, while at OU, to enter the Methodist ministry and became active in denominational activities, including summer camps more devoted to social justice than personal redemption.  “I went into the ministry to use the church to elicit political change according to a soft Marxist vision of wealth distribution and proletarian empowerment” (p. 50).   Still more:  “I found Saul Alinsky’s teaching of socialist pragmatism and political opportunism extremely useful as I made plans to co-opt religious structures as instruments for the fundamental transformation of society” (p. 53).  

He then entered Southern Methodist University’s Perkins School of Theology and served as youth minister for a nearby Congregational church.  He read voraciously and plunged energetically into ecumenical endeavors (especially promoting the World Council of Churches).  Determined to pursue a PhD, he went to Yale University, where he worked with H. Richard Niebuhr and some of the most distinguished luminaries in the Protestant world.  He also embraced, without much thought, the “demythologizing” approach to Scripture personified by Rudolph Bultmann.  Finishing his PhD course work, he returned to SMU and earned for himself a reputation as a “situation ethicist,” fully committed to a “what’s happening now” existential agenda.  Joining  the faculty at Phillips Graduate Seminary in Enid, Oklahoma he churned out books championing every thing from Rogerian psychology (with its emphasis on “unconditional love”) to existential ethics to socialist economics to radical feminism.  Traditional Christian doctrines, such as the Incarnation and Resurrection, he either ignored or “professed” with inner reservations evacuating them of substance.  But during a year spent studying in Europe, he read Wolfart Pannenberg and discovered significant flaws in both Bultmann and Karl Barth.  He also became disillusioned with Freudian psychoanalysis (long a mainstay in his understanding of and prescriptions for pastoral psychology). 

Back in America, sitting on a Houston bench during an Earth Day march in 1969, he fully felt “a revulsion against the self-preoccupation, narcissism and anarchy” that had characterized his adult years.  Sitting on that bench, he picked up his copy of the Book of Common Prayer.  “I read out loud:  ‘Almighty Father, who has given thine only Son to die for our sins, and to rise again for our justification; Grant us so to put away the leaven of malice and wickedness, that we may always serve thee in pureness of living and through the merits of the same thy Son Jesus Christ our Lord.  Amen.’  My eyes filled with tears as I asked myself what had I been missing in all my frenzied subculture of experimental living” (p. 126).  

His “change of heart” synchronized with his 1970 move to Drew Theological Seminary in New Jersey, where, as a tenured professor of theology, he began to learn theology!  One of his colleagues, Will Herberg, a “brilliant, diminutive, forceful, bearded Russian Jew” both accelerated Oden’s growing disillusionment with Marxism and prodded him to seriously study authentic Christian thought.  Herberg told him that he “was densely ignorant of Christianity.”  Indeed:  “Holding one finger up, looking straight at me with fury in his eyes, he said, ‘You will remain theologically uneducated until you study carefully Athanasius, Augustine and Aquinas.’  In his usual gruff voice and brusque speech, he told me I had not yet met the great minds of my own religious tradition” (p. 136).  Suitably chastised—and admirably open to Herberg’s wisdom—Oden turned his life around by turning to the classic sources of the Christian tradition.  “Soon I reveled in the very premises I had set aside and rationalized away:  the preexistent Logos, the triune mystery, the radical depth of sin passing through the generations, the risen Lord and the grace of baptism” (p. 138).  

Thenceforth he devoted himself to following the rule of St Ireaneus of Lyons:  invent no new doctrines!  He realized that by endeavoring to do so during the first half of his life (promoting “vast plans for social change”) he had inadvertently but tragically “harmed many innocents, especially the unborn.  The sexually permissive lifestyle, which I had not joined but failed to critique, led to a generation of fatherless children.  The political policies I had promoted were intended to increase justice by political means but ended by diminishing personal responsibility and freedom” (p. 145).  Guilt-ridden, especially for teaching a situational “social ethics to young pastors” and providing them “a rationale for their blessing convenience abortions” while ignoring the intrinsic evil of the act, he turned to God for solace.  What God said in response was simply:  “no excuse.  I had been wrong, wrong, wrong” (p. 157).  

Oden’s “change of heart” quickly led to a change in his publications.  He worked to bring theological studies back to the classic, “consensual” position of the Church’s first five centuries.  Despite his best efforts, Oden had little influence in Methodist circles or even in his own institution, which continued its leftward drift during the ‘80s.  He became “a lonely voice” for the orthodox Christian tradition “amid a chorus of indignant advocates” (p. 184) of whatever was newest and most “cutting edge” in academia.  Especially belligerent at Drew were the radical feminists who vindictively targeted him (despite his lengthy record of supporting women’s rights) for opprobrium.   As feminists gained control of the seminary, they promoted a radical agenda composed of “gender language, abortion rights, reproductive rights and sexual ethics” (p. 186). 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In his final days as a professor at Drew Theological Seminary, Thomas Oden published Requiem:  A Lament in Three Movements (Nashville:  Abingdon Press, c. 1995) to register his “affectionate anguish” over  both seminary education and the state of mainline Protestant denominations in the United States.  Having discovered and sought to make available the great resources of the classic Christian tradition, he styled himself a “young fogey” so committed to the truth of the past that he was considered “old-fashioned” by the legions of “modernists” now controlling mainline institutions.  “As a former sixties radical,” he confessed, “I am now out of the closet as an orthodox evangelical (yes, you read me right—orthodox evangelical)” (p. 15).  Explaining “the feast I left” Oden recounted an incident in his seminary’s chapel devoted to worshipping the goddess “Sophia.”  The woman presiding at the service described Sophia as “a strong, proud, creative goddess within the biblical tradition,” a “divine saving figure” immanent “in all things, waiting to be discovered.”  At that moment Oden “felt just a little (for the first time in my life) like the apologists of the second century must have felt when confronted with the challenge of attesting the Lordship of Christ amid a pagan pantheon of Greco-Roman deities” (p. 29).  Though this kind of service is, Oden insists, quite limited to radical hyperfeminist circles, it does in fact represent powerful currents within contemporary Christianity. 

The fact that a goddess, Sophia, could be worshipped in a Methodist seminary points to the tarnished state of theological education in America.  To Oden, the culprit in the story is Secularization, an “interloper” who has stolen the doctrinal, liturgical and devotional riches of the church.  Mainline seminaries have aided and abetted this secularizing process, wedding themselves to a “modernity” (what Oden calls “mod rot”) that is already passing away.  They have provided a safe place for trendy, tenured radicals who worked closely with ecclesiastical bureaucracies to promote “change” in the church.  Self-consciously “liberated” and socially engaged, they generally considered themselves “doctrinally imaginative, liturgically experimental, disciplinarily nonjudgmental, politically correct, multiculturally tolerant, morally broad-minded, ethically situationist, and, above all, sexually lenient, permissive, uninhibited” (p. 34).  Consequently:  “It seems worth noting that the liberated seminary at its zenith has finally achieved a condition that has never before prevailed in Christian history:  Heresy simply does not exist” (p. 46). 

In addition to the seminaries, Secularization afflicts the ecumenical organizations which once promised to unite Christians and make more effective their witness.  In his younger years, Oden invested much time and energy in ecumenical endeavors, but in time he became disillusioned with them.  In particular, they were dominated by elite planners, bureaucrats determined to save the world through political processes!  As “political idealists,” they “care far less about the classical Christianity of the grassroots church than about their ideals and programs and blueprints for reforming the denominational networks” (p. 92).    Quite apart from organizations such as the WCC, a real ecumenical movement (orchestrated by the Holy Spirit rather than bureaucrats) has brought conservative Evangelicals, Roman Catholics, and Eastern Orthodox together, affirming their belief in ancient creeds and uniting to oppose the “culture of death” most evident in abortion-on-demand.

Such believers illustrate the emergence and worth of what Oden terms “Postmodern Paleo-orthodox Spirituality.”  It is a spirituality deeply rooted in the Ancient Christianity best expounded by Athanasius, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Wesley.  “Christian orthodoxy in its ancient (paleo) ecumenical sense is summarily defined sacramentally by the baptismal formula (in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), liturgically the by the Eucharistic event, and doctrinally by the baptismal confession with its precisely remembered rule of faith as recalled in the Apostles’, Nicene, and Athanasian creeds, and their subsequent consensual interpretations” (p. 130).  Despite having been shunted aside by liberals and modernists during the past 200 years, it retains an abiding strength clearly evident for 20 centuries.   Modernity, Oden believes, is collapsing, though dinosaurs proclaiming its wonders still stalk the halls of academic and culturally powerful institutions.  But Paleo-orthodoxy will survive and prosper simply because it is eternally true and will provide its adherents with eternal life, now and forever.  Routinely declared dead and gone, this classic Christianity revives and flourishes again and again, for:  “Life lived in Christ does not waste time resenting the inexorable fact that each culture like each person dies.  Sanctifying grace offers beleaguered cultural pilgrims the power and means of trusting fundamentally in the One who proffers this ever-changing, forever-dying historical process” (p. 130).  

Young Evangelicals in particular seem committed to exploring and expounding this ancient tradition.  Thus Oden, having begun his life within a family still rooted in orthodoxy, has returned to the basic tenets of its creeds.  With T.S. Eliot he has clearly discovered the timeless truth that “In my beginning is my end.”  Consequently:  “There is only the fight to recover what has been lost /  And found and lost again and again:  and now, under conditions / That seem unproptitious” (“East Coker,” in Four Quartets).  

                                          * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Anyone looking for a comprehensive discussion of doctrine with a resolutely “back-to-the-Fathers” brand of thinking will benefit from reading Thomas Oden’s trilogy: The Living God:  Systematic Theology: Volume One (San Francisco:  Harper & Row, Publishers, c. 1987); The Word of Life:  Systematic Theology:  Volume Two (San Francisco:  Harper & Row, c. 1989); and Life in the Spirit:  Systematic Theology:  Volume Three (San Francisco:  HarperSanFrancisco, c. 1992).  Oden sought to formulate an ecumenical, consensual theology—“an ordered view of the faith of the Christian community” (I,ix), mutually acceptable to Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant believers.  Amidst a world culturally collapsing it’s time to rediscover the common roots of the various traditions which will equip Christ’s Church to move rightly into the uncertainties of tomorrow.  That requires us to find guides who are not so much up-to-date as they are dateless, less avante-guarde than guarding the gates, less attuned to the times than in touch with the past.  Oden insists that the core doctrines of Christianity were effectively defined during the first 500 years of Church history and are best discerned in the biblical and classical documents preserved from antiquity.  We need nothing new!  What we need is a renewal of what’s true!  

    In The Word of Life he reflected:  “By the middle of the 1970’s the idea had gradually begun to dawn upon me with increasing force that it is not my task to crate a theology.  Newman taught me that the deposit of truth is already sufficiently given, fully and adequately.  What I needed to do was to listen.  But I could not listen because I found my modern presuppositions constantly tyrannizing my listening” (II, p. 219).  But in time he learned to listen, largely by discarding contemporary theology, which proved bankrupt.  The ones he learned to hear were the biblical writers and Early Church Fathers.  His resolve to hear them provides both the strength and weakness of Oden’s work:  the vast collection of quotations and citations provides us a wealth of valuable information, but it also makes for ponderous reading too much of the time.  That the title of each volume of his systematic theology includes the word “life” indicates the theme which binds together the entire study.  God the Father gives life as Creator, for “God is uncreated, necessary, one, infinite, immense, eternal being, the life of all that lives” (I, p. 52).  God the Son came to save us not simply “through assent to doctrine but through union with the living Christ” (II, p. 434).  Indeed:  “The ancient ecumenical testimony is that Jesus now lives so as to engender life in us.  His living presence is the real energy and force and dynamic and power of historic Christianity and present Christian life” (II, p. 435).  God the Spirit, as defined at Constantinople in 381 A.D., is “the Lord and giver of life” and gives it to all that lives.  “Merely to be alive is to be endowed with life by the Spirit of God” (III, p. 36).  In the judgment of Cyril of Jerusalem, something radically new transpired at Pentecost as the believers ‘were baptized completely” in the Holy Spirit—a fresh draught of God’s Presence which instilled a “‘sober drunkenness, deadly to sin and life-giving to the heart’” (III, p. 67).

Oden sought not to be “original” or “creative” but to faithfully distill and explain the essential traditions of the Church makes these volumes most valuable.  And he did so effectively.

403  Intelligent Design

During the past few decades some eminent atheists have openly modified their views.  Anthony Flew, after promoting atheism in some of England’s finest universities, announced There Is A God, admitting he was now a deist.  Thomas Nagel, one of America’s most esteemed philosophers, still holds to his atheist faith but acknowledges the naturalistic evolution he espoused cannot adequately explain human consciousness or the intricate design of the cosmos.  Both men note the influence of scholars making the case for “intelligent design” in forcing them to reevaluate their views.  Both are questioning their atheistic assumption that the material world is all there is.  Perhaps, as St. Paul thought, “the invisible things” of God are “clearly seen” in the world He made.  During the past three decades this position has been advanced by a corps of scholars insisting there is an “intelligent design” evident throughout creation.  Notable in advancing this position was Philip E. Johnson, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley.  A Harvard Law graduate who had clerked for Chief Justice Earl Warren, his analysis of Darwinism led him to think it was essentially a philosophical theory lacking credible evidence and logic.  So he published Darwin on Trial (Downer’s Grove:  InterVarsity Press, c. 1991).  His treatise elicited considerable discussion, and Johnson used his formidable rhetorical skills to debate a variety of atheistic evolutionists.  Soon thereafter he published Reason in the Balance:  The Case Against Naturalism in Science, Law & Education (Downer’s Grove:  InterVarsity Press, c. 1995), asking:  “Is God the true Creator of everything that exists, or is God a product of the human imagination, real only in the minds of those who believe”  (p. 7).  At stake is the question of Ultimate Truth, the Being of God, and of our ability to know Him and the realities He created—beings—which exist independently of ourselves.  

   Johnson thought we need “a qualified opposition party that is willing and able to challenge the established religious philosophy itself, the metaphysical naturalism that is so successfully promoted in the name of science” (p. 96).  He enlisted in this party and served very much as a paratrooper—a battle-scarred commando working behind enemy lines, preparing the way for a coming corps of dissidents, willing to assail the bunkers and dismantle the reigning orthodoxies of naturalistic evolution.  He declared that the presuppositions of naturalistic science make sense only if there’s no God.  But if God really IS, as Johnson holds, the metaphysical assumptions undergirding monistic materialism (i.e. Darwinism) cannot stand.  If God really IS and created all that is, “the living world is the product of an intelligent and purposeful Creator rather than merely a combination of chance events and impersonal natural laws” (p. 74).  Conversely, those who eliminate God from the cosmos allow only random events in an iron-clad impersonal universe—“chance and necessity.”  This position Johnson calls the “blind watchmaker thesis,” using the title of biologist Richard Dawkins’ work whose subtitle declares that “the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design.”  Though admitting that much in our marvelous world seems to be as well-designed as a great  cathedral—that a single cell has more data “than all the volumes of the Encyclopaedia Britannica put together”—Dawkins adamantly insisted such “design” is purely an illusion and everything can be explained by “natural selection.”

     To call into question such reductionistic declarations, Johnson argued the evidence (i.e. fossils and genetics) suggests design.  Perhaps the marvels of nature Dawkins admits appear to be designed are in fact, designed!  Christian scholars especially, Johnson says, need the courage to live in truth, “to assert that God is real and that the evidence reflects the truth that nature was created by God” (p. 202).  He found it thoroughly mystifying that “Christian” scholars, whether scientists or theologians, seemingly feared to challenge Darwinian pieties when they should be among their most vigorous and articulate critics.

     In fact:  “Christianity makes sense only if its factual premises are true and if it is providing meaningful answers to questions that people ought to be asking.  The essential factual premise is that God created us for a purpose, and our destiny is a glorious one in eternity” (p. 204). 

                  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *                      

In 2004, the Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington, a scholarly journal housed at the Smithsonian Institution, published a peer-reviewed article by Stephen Meyer. advocating intelligent design.  Angry scientists, alarmed at the article’s deviation from the party line, demanded the journal’s editor be censured for allowing such heresy to gain traction.  In due course, he was demoted and assigned to another position within the institution.  In time his career was ruined and he was ostracized from the inner ring of biologists.   Such is the opposition that meets any scholar who dares study biology with anything less than a philosophical commitment to monistic materialism—a stance nicely illustrated in Francis Crick’s admonition that biologists, while marveling at the mystery of DNA, must “‘constantly keep in mind that what they see was not designed, but rather evolved’” (p. 12).  .  

Nevertheless, the article’s author, Stephen Meyer, persevered in his studies and amplified his case for intelligent design in Signature in the Cell:  DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design (New York:  HarperCollins Publishers, c. 2009).  Meyer received his Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge in the philosophy of science and this book, he said, “attempts to make a comprehensive, interdisciplinary argument for a new view of the origin of life.  It makes ‘one long argument’ for the theory of intelligent design” (p. 8).  Consequently it was, said Steve Fuller “at once a philosophical history of how information has come to be central to cutting-edge research in biology today and one man’s intellectual journey to the conclusion that intelligent design and provides the explanation for that fact.”  Meyer primarily focused on the reality of non-material information within the biological world.  Just as you can load “information” into a computer without adding any weight to its material components, so too information (evident in the DNA) has been programmed into all that lives.  Consequently, evolutionary biologists, though deeply committed to reductionistic materialism, cannot avoid using teleological language that refers to intentionality and purpose when describing what they behold.  Overtly denying design, they cannot find words that fail to imply it!  

As a young scientist, Meyer himself became enamored with the mystery of life while attending a conference that addressed “three big scientific questions—the origin of the universe, the origin of life, and the nature of human consciousness” (p. 24).   One of the speakers was “Charles Thaxton, the chemist who with his coauthors had proposed the controversial idea about an intelligence playing a role in the origin of biological information” (p. 28).  Intellectually challenged, Meyer decided to pursue his interests in one of the world’s elite research universities (Cambridge) and discern the degree to which information, not mindless matter-in-motion, best explains life’s mysterious origins.  Something rational must supply the rationality, the information so evident in all that lives.  Most great scientists in the history of science—giants such as Kepler and Newton—saw divine design everywhere in the world they studied.  They did so because they inferred the makings of history from its results—employing what Charles Sanders Peirce would label “abduction.”  For example, none of us has seen Abraham Lincoln, but we cannot, as historians, explain the Civil War without affirming his existence and activities.  So too cosmologists now embrace the Big Bang as the best explanation of the origin of the universe, remarkably unlike the “steady state” theories that long dominated the field.  

Everywhere it seems evident that intelligent agents—and only intelligent agents—are responsible for specified information.  To explain (using abductive reason) all the information in living organisms, it simply makes sense to posit the possibility of an Intelligent Agent as its source.  Mathematical calculations render the possibility of chance (random material events) creating life nearly preposterous.  We’re faced with the fact, as G.K. Chesterton said a century ago, that:  “Evolution as explanation, as an ultimate philosophy of the cause of living things, is still faced with the problem of producing rabbits out of an empty hat; a process commonly involving some hint of Design.”  After carefully explaining (and rejecting) various naturalistic hypotheses, Meyer declares that since “evidence for the causal adequacy of intelligence is all around us both inside and outside the lab” (p. 340) it makes sense to attribute the vera causa of life to intelligent design.   “Experience shows that large amounts of specified complexity or information (especially codes and languages) invariably originate from an intelligent source—from a mind or a personal agent” (p. 343).  

Meyer meticulously considered a multitude of issues in 500 pages, adding another 50 pages of endnotes and 30 pages of bibliographical references to scholarly literature.   “In Signature in the Cell,” says Scott Turner, a SUNY professor of environmental and forest biology, “Stephen C. Meyer gives us a fascinating exploration of the case for intelligent design theory, woven skillfully around a compelling account of Meyer’s own journey.” 

                                                           * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

During the past two decades the dramatic increase of Americans self-identifying as “Nones” (having no religious faith) has concerned thoughtful Christians.  Particularly among the young, it seems, many are disinterested and even hostile to the Christian tradition.  Asked by pollsters to explain their stance, they often say “science” (especially the chemical evolution of life and the biological evolution of species) had disproved it.  Concerned by this development, Stephen Meyer wrote Return of the God Hypothesis:  Three Scientific Discoveries that Reveal the Mind Behind the Universe (New York:  HarperOne, Kindle Edition, c. 2021) to show why their position is certainly questionable and probably untenable.  Meyer currently works with the Discovery Institute in Seattle, WA.  In his earlier scholarly works he “argued that certain features of living systems—in particular, the digitally encoded information present in DNA and the complex circuitry and information-processing systems at work in living cells—are best explained by the activity of an actual designing intelligence.  Just as the inscriptions on the Rosetta Stone point to the activity of an ancient scribe and the software in a computer program points to a programmer, I’ve argued that the digital code discovered within the DNA molecule suggests the activity of a designing mind in the origin of life,” though  he refrained from making philosophical claims concerning the existence of God.  

In his recent treatise, however, he makes such claims, challenging entrenched scientific dogmas that shape the worldview of millions of people.  He begins by acknowledging that today’s scientific worldview is deeply materialistic, asserting that “matter, energy, and/or the laws of physics are the entities from which everything else came and that those entities have existed from eternity past as the uncreated foundation of all that exists.  Matter, energy, and physical laws are, therefore, viewed by materialists as self-existent.”  Without any mental qualities, these entities have randomly assembled themselves into all that exists.  So there cannot be immaterial realities such as God or the human soul.  Varieties of materialism have been propounded for thousands of years by ancient Greeks such as Democritus as well as makers of modernity such as Thomas Hobbes, Charles Darwin, and Francis Crick.  The materialistic position was succinctly summed up by astronomer Carl Sagan:  “The cosmos is all that is, or ever was, or ever will be.”  On the contrary, Meyer seeks to demonstrate that:  “The properties of the universe and of life—specifically as they pertain to understanding their origins—are just ‘what we should expect’ if a transcendent and purposive intelligence has acted in the history of life and the cosmos.  Such an intelligence coincides with what human beings have called God, and so I call this story of reversal the return of the God hypothesis” (p. 19).  This “hypothesis” was basic to the development of modern science, as is evident in the works of Copernicus, Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton.  In short:  Meyer’s views are thoroughly in accord with the West’s greatest scientists.

In the 19th century, however, the “theistic science” of Newton et al. was edged aside by the “scientific materialism” now dominating the West.  Yet, amazingly, as the 21st century begins, some of the guiding assumptions of materialism seem to be crumbling.  By definition, materialism assumes the eternality of the material world—in one mode or another matter has existed and simply circulated from one thing to another, and no Creator is needed to explain it.  However, sophisticated discoveries by astronomers such as Edwin Hubble led to an avalanche of evidence regarding an expanding universe which pointed to an initial, explosive moment of creation, popularly known as the “big bang.”  (This is the first of Meyer’s three scientific discoveries justifying the return of the God hypothesis.)  One of Hubble’s gifted associates, Alan Sandage, an agnostic for much of his life, found the evidence so persuasive that he ultimately changed his mind.  Speaking at a meeting in 1985, “he not only described the astronomical evidence for the beginning of the universe; he shocked many of his colleagues by announcing a recent religious conversion and then explaining how the scientific evidence of a ‘creation event’ had contributed to a profound change in his worldview.  I recall his looking intently at the audience and gravely stating, ‘Here is evidence for what can only be described as a supernatural event. There is no way that this could have been predicted within the realm of physics as we know it.’  As he spoke, he paused between the words ‘super’ and ‘natural,’ saying them separately for emphasis. He went on to explain that ‘science, until recently, has concerned itself not with primary causes, but secondary causes.  What has happened in the last fifty years is a remarkable event within astronomy and astrophysics.  By looking up at the sky, some astronomers have come to the belief that there is evidence for a ‘creation event’” (p. 172).  What Sandage and contemporary cosmologists recognize as a point of “singularity” indicates the physical universe came into being from nothing physical!  It was, as Christian theologians have always declared:  “creatio ex nihilo—‘creation out of nothing’ (nothing physical, that is)” (p. 186). 

The second scientific discovery Meyer discusses is often called the “Goldilocks Universe.”  From every angle of investigation, the universe seems amazingly fine-tuned.  Four fundamental forces underlie all that is:  gravity; electromagnetism; the strong nuclear force; the weak nuclear force.  The slightest difference in any one of these forces would have made the formation of the universe impossible.  Essential chemicals, most especially carbon, need to be precisely what they are in order for anything to be.  Physicist Fred “Hoyle was stunned by these and other ‘cosmic coincidences’ that physicists began to discover after the 1950s.  Whereas before he affirmed atheism and denied any evidence of design, he began to see fine tuning as obvious evidence of intelligent design.  As he put it in 1981, ‘A common-sense interpretation of the facts suggests that a super-intellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as with chemistry and biology, and that there are no blind forces worth speaking about in nature.  The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming as to put this conclusion almost beyond question’” (p. 218). 

The third scientific discovery Meyer explores is the “origin of life and the DNA enigma.”  Monistic materialists, such as Richard Dawkins, tenaciously upheld the dogma that biology is “‘the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose’” (p. 257).”  But the more we know of living things the more it seems they have been meticulously designed by an all-knowing Mind.  The notion that “chance and necessity” would bring living creatures into being appears less and less possible.  Thus “Nobel laureate Christian de Duve, a leading origin-of-life biochemist until his death in 2013, categorically rejected the chance hypothesis precisely because he judged the necessary fortuitous convergence of events implausible in the extreme.  As he put it, ‘A single, freak, highly improbable event can conceivably happen.  Many highly improbable events—drawing a winning lottery number or the distribution of playing cards in a hand of bridge—happen all the time.  But a string of improbable events—drawing the same lottery number twice or the same bridge hand twice in a row—does not happen naturally’” (p. 273).  Nor, says Meyer, could life on earth have happened naturally!  Furthermore,  since the discovery of DNA every materialistic explanation of the information indwelling and shaping biological cells has failed.  

Beyond calling into question the materialistic position on the origin-of-life, Meyer argues Intelligent Design properly explains it.  The creative action of a conscious and intelligent agent clearly represents a known and adequate cause (one ‘now in operation’) for the origin of specified information.  Uniform and repeated experience affirms that intelligent agents can produce large amounts of functional or specified information, whether in software programs, ancient inscriptions, or Shakespearean sonnets. The specified information in the cell also points to intelligent design not just as an adequate explanation, but as the best explanation. Why?  Experience shows that large amounts of specified information invariably originate from an intelligent source.  This is particularly apparent when the information is expressed in a digital or alphabetic form.  A computer user who traces the information on a screen back to its source invariably comes to a mind, that of a software engineer.  Similarly, the information in a book or newspaper article ultimately derives from a writer—from a mental, rather than a strictly material, cause” (p. 288).  

In his final chapters, Meyer shows how the these scientific discoveries justify believing the “God hypothesis.”  An Intelligent Being could bring into being all that is, design it meticulously, and create living creatures on planet earth.  The rational process of abduction—inference to the best explanation—makes such belief highly reasonable and persuasive.  Reflecting on his research at Cambridge University, especially devoted to one of its most illustrations professors, Sir Isaac Newton, he thought about “how thinking about science and God had changed since the publication of Newton’s great Principia in 1687, almost exactly three centuries earlier.  In the epilogue to a later edition of that book called ‘The General Scholium’ and in other scientific works, notably the Opticks, Newton articulated a profoundly theological perspective.  Not only did he extol the order and uniformity of nature as a reflection of God’s character and superintending care of creation; he argued for the existence of God based on the design evident in nature—in short, for a God hypothesis” (p. 593).  Newton “also understood that the most fundamental laws of nature either merely describe the observed regularities in nature or they manifest the ‘constant Spirit action’ of a ‘Divine Sustainer’ of the world.  He did not think the laws of physics alone explained the origin of the solar system or, still less, the origin of the universe” (p. 596).  Consequently:  “For Newton, nature not only provided evidential support for belief in God, but his God hypothesis functioned as a hugely productive science starter.  There is no reason to think that updating that hypothesis will threaten scientific advance today. On the contrary, there is good reason to expect that it will inspire deeper interest in discovering more about the intricacy, order, and design of the universe, just as it did for Newton himself” (p. 622).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Just recently I’ve become acquainted with the works of an Oxford mathematician, John Lennox.  He has had a remarkable life, helping spread the Gospel throughout the world.  Through many lectures, podcasts and books he has attracted many followers, and he openly identifies with the Intelligent Design corps of scholars, as is evident in Cosmic Chemistry:  Do God and Science Mis? and his autobiography, My Life.  Christians concerned with rightly reading both Scripture and Creation will find in Lennox a first rate thinker with an engaging approach to our world. 

402 Jaques Maritain

In graduate school, 60 years ago, I encountered the work of Jacques Maritain, delighted to find a first-rate Christian philosopher, and over the years read many of his books.  To understand him it helps to peruse a two volume memoir by his wife, Raissa, entitled We Have Been Friends Together and Adventures in Grace; both appear in a single volume (Garden City:  Image Books, 1961).  Raissa, a Russian Jewess, brought to her union with Jacques a poetic and deeply contemplative mind which he routinely credited for expanding and enriching his philosophical endeavors.  Though reared without much religious instruction, as a teenager she sensed a deep spiritual hunger.  Above all, she remembers, “I had to make sure of the essential thing:  the possession of the truth about God, about myself, and about the world.  It was, I knew, the necessary foundation for my life” (p. 34).  Raissa’s parents emigrated to Paris; there she finished her schooling, though her teachers, espousing a “rationalistic skepticism and pseudo-scientific positivism” (p. 119) which restricted itself to empirical data—failed to open for her the doors to truth.  Then she met Jacques Maritain, who shared with her similar longings for intellectual nourishment unavailable in the schools.

     They fortunately encountered, in Paris at the turn of the century, free spirits such as Henri Bergson (a world-acclaimed philosopher), Charles Peguy (a noted poet), and Leon Bloy (a radically-committed Catholic writer).  Such thinkers helped point them to the realm of truth and the riches of Christianity which neither young person had hitherto encountered.  Ultimately they “were brought face to face with the question of God, both in all its power and in all its urgency” (p. 99).  Their spiritual quest led them to embrace the Christian Faith.  Both were baptized and thenceforth sought to bring all of life into the love and service of Christ and His Church.  For Jacques, sensing a call “to philosophize truly” (p. 143), this meant, initially, a renunciation of professional ambition, for he feared (with good reason) that he could not freely teach as a professing Christian in the state-controlled universities of France.  

     So he began his career as an independent philosopher!  In that process Jacques and Raissa discovered St Thomas Aquinas and found in him the intellectual foundations they needed.  In Raissa’s experience, the “first reading of the Summa Theologica was as if I had been given a very pure gift.”  Therein she encountered truly sanctified intelligence.  “So great a light kept flowing into both my heart and mind that I was carried away as if by a joy of Paradise.  To pray, to understand, was for me one and the same thing; the one made me thirst for the other, and that thirst in me I felt to be constantly, and yet never, quenched” (p. 183).

     In one of his early lectures (1913) Jacques declared:  “There is but one region where the soul and the intellect live in the peace of God and grow in grace and truth; it is in the light of Thomism” (p. 341).  Given that confidence, Maritain devoted the rest of his life to spearheading a revival, a contemporary restatement, of the thought of St Thomas.  In time he wrote some 50 books and held prestigious positions, including appointments to the University of Chicago and Princeton University.  Though Raissa’s memoirs tell us far more about their friends than about themselves, they’re beautifully written and help us understand the formative years wherein the Maritains flourished and undertook to make relevant the timeless wisdom of St Thomas Aquinas.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Helping launch Mid-America Nazarene College, in 1968, I thought seriously about Christian education and found Jacques Maritain’s Education at the Crossroads (New Haven:  Yale University Press, c. 1943) most helpful.  If we have a realistic understanding of human nature and society, if we recognize the need for moral guidance, he said, we can effectively design healthy educational systems.   What is man?  What is the nature of human nature?   To answer this question is the most important of educational inquiries. To him, “moral re-education is really a matter of public emergency,” for without it schoolrooms become unruly and chaotic.   This means we must set forth coherent “aims of education” which give order and direction to our endeavors.  “Education is an art,” he said, “and an especially difficult one” (p. 2).  It is an “ethical art” which seeks to free persons to attain the end for which they are created.  As practitioners of the art of teaching, teachers are more like farmers or doctors than sculptors, for there must be an attentiveness to the nature of the person, an ars cooperativa naturae—art cooperating with nature.  

    To both teachers and students, Aquinas said:  “‘never leave behind him any difficulty unsolved.’”   “He also warned teachers . . . ‘never to dig a ditch that you fail to fill up.’  He knew that to raise clever doubts, to prefer searching to finding, and perpetually to pose problems without ever solving them are the great enemies of education” (p. 50).  Above all, education should encourage the development of moral reasoning, virtuous living, qualities of mind and character which, we early discover, cannot be mechanically inscribed in the young.  Facts can, at least momentarily, be poured in.  Data can be inscribed in computers, and young people often acquire lots of facts.  But they know little about the soul, the life of the spirit, the moral dimension to life, the life of freedom.  Moral persons, of course, are necessarily free persons who make moral decisions and become persons of character.   

     What we mainly aspire to, as persons, is freedom.  Most deeply, we long for an inner spiritual freedom, the freedom which St Paul described as freedom of the Spirit.  Our social world, our vocational world, have worth, but they lack the eternal dimensions our hearts crave.  “Thus the prime goal of education is the conquest of internal and spiritual freedom to be achieved by the individual person, or, in others words, his liberation through knowledge and wisdom, good will, and love” (p. 11). Ultimately such things are gifts from God, gifts of grace.  The true liberation we all need is freedom from self-centeredness, egoism, sin.  Thus there is, in a profound sense, an essentially religious component to genuine education.  Ultimately, he said, ‘our chief duty consists, according to the profound saying of the Greek poet, Pindar, in becoming who we are, nothing is more important for each of us, or more difficult, than to become a man.  Thus the chief task of education is above all to shape man, or to guide the evolving dynamism through which man forms himself as a man” (p. 1).  Indeed, “education is not animal training.  The education of man is a human awakening” (p. 9).

  If, in fact, the Greek, Jewish, and Christian understanding is correct, we best understand “man as an animal endowed with reason, whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; and man as a free individual in personal relation with God, whose supreme righteousness consists in voluntarily obeying the law of God; and man as a sinful and wounded creature called to divine life and to the freedom of grace, whose supreme perfection consists of love” (p. 7).  And this definition of human nature leads to distinctively different educational strategies.

    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Teaching Ethics I benefited from Jacques Maritain’s Moral Philosophy:  An historical and critical survey of the great systems (New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, c. 1964).  He said his work was an “historical and critical examination of a certain number of great systems which are, in my opinion, the most significant ones with respect to the development and the adventures of moral philosophy, and those which it is most important to consider for a work of prise de conscience and intellectual renewal to which our age seems called, at least in the eyes of a few who still care for wisdom” (p. ix).  He first examined the great Ancient, Medieval, and Enlightenment ethicists whose conversation so illuminates the study of moral philosophy.  He found much to admire— while always pointing out glaring flaws—in the positions taken by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Epicureans.  They raised the right questions, explored the available options, and took seriously their calling to reason toward truth.  But they failed to discover how to achieve what all ethicists urge us to achieve:  transcending a purely physical, human existence and becoming what we really ought to be!

     Into that ancient world came Christianity, with a different (and, to Maritain, far better) philosophy.  Medieval Christians understood wisdom to be something far more than a purely human attainment.  “Medieval Christianity was dominated by the law of descending motion of supreme wisdom to which we called attention in speaking of the Old Testament, and knew its name–it is the law of the Incarnation.  Thomas Aquinas formulated it in a text of limitless significance:  ‘In the mystery of the Incarnation,’ he says, ‘the descent of the divine plenitude into human nature is of greater import than the ascent of human nature, taken as pre-existent, toward Divinity’” (p. 74; quoting Sum. theol., III, 34, 1, ad 1).  Beyond Plato’s hunger for the transcendent Good, beyond Aristotle’s desire for Happiness, Christianity “has its supreme archetype in a subsistent Good which is a loving Personality—three Persons in a single nature, one of whom has been incarnated, [so that] moral reflection now understands definitively and explicitly that the Good is something other than Happiness, and that the first demand and the first condition of moral rectitude is to love the Good more than Happiness” (p. 77).  Medieval Scholastics such as St Thomas lived in a theocentric world.  Only as things are rightly related to God do they move smoothly.  Only as men and women find their final End in God do they live with meaning and purpose.  So only an ethic which acknowledges God as the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, truly suits human beings.  Both ancient and modern thinkers routinely betray a longing for some transcendent source of values, some truly final end, but the humanistic limitations imposed on their systems keeps them locked within an inadequate vision of Reality.

     From the Medieval World, Maritain jumps to Immanuel Kant, the last of the great ethicists who operated within a largely intact Christian worldview, though he does in fact take some crucial steps away from it.  With his concern for disinterestedness and duty, Kant embraced some of the traditional Christian concern for unselfish love and responsibility.  Yet, importantly, he effectively denied God any role in the process.  His ethic “makes out of God an appendix to morality, not its foundation” (p. 102).  Finding within one’s own mind a “categorical imperative” able to reason what one ought or ought not do, Kantian ethics encourages the love of moral law but not of God, the love of treating others rightly but not the love of others.  With Kant, Maritain believes, we step over a threshold and thenceforth must deal with what he calls “the great illusions.”  These include Hegel’s Idealism, Marx’s Dialectical Materialism, and Auguste Comte’s Positivism.  These highly influential thinkers are “exponents of modern anthropocentrism whose work has seriously disorganized moral knowledge, not only among philosophers but also in broad sectors of the common conscience” (p. 353).  More recent philosophers, such as Sartre and Dewey, offer little more, in Maritain’s opinion, though he grants them the courtesy of serious consideration.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

     One of Jacques Maritain’s most significant philosophical treatises is entitled Distinguish to Unite, or The Degrees of Knowledge (New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, c. 1959).  “We hope to show in this book,” Maritain said, ‘that Thomistic realism, in preserving, according to a truly critical method, the value of the knowledge of things, opens the way to an exploration of the world of reflection in its very inwardness and to the establishment of its metaphysical topology, so to speak; thus, ‘philosophy of being’ is at once, and par excellence, ‘philosophy of mind’” (p. ix).  The first section of the book deals with “the degrees of rational knowledge:  philosophy and experimental science.”  Here Maritain celebrates our mind’s ability to truly know, through sense experience, objective reality.  On its own, science cannot discern the essence of an existing, particular thing.  Here philosophy—metaphysics—is needed, and Maritain asserts that the Thomistic tradition offers the key to unlock the riches of metaphysical knowledge which philosophers too often eschew.  St Thomas taught the intellect has a natural ability to know, through an immediate intuition (adaequatio rei et intellectus—a bond between intellect and thing—the being of a being and thenceforth to know, by definition, its essence.  

     Maritain espoused a “critical realism” which begins with this simple assertion:  “I am aware of knowing–I am aware of knowing at least one thing, that what is, is; not: “I think” (p. 76).  In knowing that what is, is, one grasps the fundamental reality of metaphysics and begins to think truly.  Failing to begin rightly, we are afflicted by bad philosophies which, Maritain believes, must be ousted by a good philosophy.  Unfortunately, “good philosophy is more difficult than bad” (p. 196).  Just as the intuitive certainty of the “law of non-contradiction” gives one the basis for logical thinking, so too the intuitive certainty of the “law of being” (p. 215) affords one the basis for metaphysical thinking.  Thus metaphysical thinking allows one to know transintelligible” realities, immaterial realities such as person, spirit, freedom, love, and God.  

    Having discussed the importance of scientific and metaphysical knowledge—different types of rational knowing—Maritain turned, in the second half of the book, to “the degrees of suprarational knowledge.”  Here he treats the very special knowledge which comes through faith and love, the sanctifying grace which enables us to “share in the Divine Nature” (II Peter 1:4), through mystical experience, where one suffers rather than siezes “divine things” (p. 253).  While Aristotle and St Thomas serve as a good guides to rational knowledge, St John of the Cross opens to us the ultimate realms of spiritual reality.  

    In sum, Maritain holds:  “For St. John of the Cross, as for St. Thomas Aquinas and the whole Christian tradition, the final end of human life is transformation in God, ‘to become God by participation’ which is fully achieved in heaven by the beatific vision and beatific love, and fulfilled here below, in faith, by love.  Such love comes through self-surrender, which St John says is a giving to God of everything one has.  This death-to-self is absolutely necessary in order to be spiritually united with God.  Here we find best illustrated the principle of St Thomas:  grace perfects nature but does not destroy it.  

    I know of no more thoughtful discussion of mystical knowledge—the contemplative wisdom given only by God—than that Maritain provides in this volume.  That a first-rate philosopher finds in St John of the Cross the route to ultimate Truth and Wisdom, leads us to both pray and give thanks for the illumination which awaits those who heed him.  

 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

     Thomists like Maritain insist there are good, rational reasons for believing God exists.  That view is most clearly stated in Approaches to God (New York:  Collier Books, 1962).   I think this was the first book of Maritain’s I encountered as a graduate student  pursuing my own interests quite apart from class work.  Maritain first argues for “the primordial way,” the “natural or prephilosophic knowledge of God.”  We just know, deep in our being, that there’s a God who sustains our being.  This immediate awareness serves as the foundation for St Thomas Aquinas’ famous “five ways” to “prove” God exists.  If, like Aristotle and most common sense philosophers, you accept as self-evident the reality of causation, these five cosmological arguments (motion; efficient causation; contingency; degrees of perfection; government) enable you to persuasively demonstrate the necessity of “a cause which is pure Act or Being, itself subsistent in its own right” (p. 33), which indwells the various phenomena we encounter.  

    As Maritain explains and defends these “proofs,” he up-dates and effectively demonstrates their perennial validity as metaphysical arguments.  Then he adds a “sixth” possibility, one he found more and more attractive as he pondered it:  an intuition regarding “the natural spirituality of intelligence” (p. 70).  With my mind I easily transcend the limits of time and space; in my mind I am almost as infinite as the universe.  As an intellectual being, I am dramatically distinct from the material world I apprehend—if not, I could only, like a computer, process the flow of data which happens to enter my neurological system.  Thus I know, while I think, that I am a spiritual being.  But I also know that I have not always existed.  So I must, as a spiritual being, be rooted “in a Being of transcendent personality” in Whom my personality has definition and reality.   Having discussed some of the “approaches to God” of the speculative intellect, Maritain then turns to some of the ways of the practical intellect.  Whenever we see beauty, we encounter “a transcendental, a perfection in things which transcends things and attests their kinship with the infinite, because it makes them fit, to give joy to the spirit” (p. 79).  There is a certain eternality in great music and poetry which suggests its tie to some Ultimate Reality.  

     Our moral experience also, on a practical level, points us to God.  For unless we are free, as moral beings, to choose what’s good, there’s no real morality.  Yet as we reflect on the reality of personal freedom we find ourselves rooted in a transcendent realm which grants and guarantees it.  “God is thus naturally known, without any conscious judgment, in and by the impulse of the will striving toward the Separate Good, whose existence is implicitly involved in the practical value acknowledged to the moral good” (p. 88).  Finally, Maritain argued, in accord with Aristotle’s dictum, that natural appetites have realizable ends.  The fact that we’re thirsty proves, rather persuasively, that real liquids exist to slake that thirst.  Similarly, since mankind has forever hungered and thirsted for God, there must be a Reality to which that appetite is directed.  

    Though it demands careful attention, Approaches to God is not overly difficult to read.  It was written for the general reader and enables anyone who desires to master its basic arguments.  

  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

     Maritain’s final book, written in his 85th year, was The Peasant of the Garonne:  An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present Time (New York:  Holt, Rinehart and Winston, c. 1968).  Here he “calls a spade a spade” and voices his dismay at developments within the Post-Vatican II Church. 

401 Alexandr Solzhenitsyn

In one of my chapel talks I said that of all persons alive on planet earth I’d most like to meet Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the great Russian writer, who was for me a powerful witness, revealing important truths regarding Communism, the importance of writers, and the durability of “permanent things.  During the 1970s I read most of his novels as well as The Gulag Archipelago, a massive (three volume) documentation of Bolshevik brutality.  Thanks to him, I discarded some of the American academy’s gilded portraits of the USSR and was better prepared to discern the Marxist themes so deftly infusing many analyses of American history.  I was also prompted to re-examine America’s role in the world vis-à-vis both Communism and  Islam.  He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1970, and his Nobel Lecture (New York:  Farrar, Straus and Giroux, c. 1972) focused on artists.  Some—infatuated with their avante garde role—engaged in rebellion and self-assertion.  Others, such as Solzhenitsyn, considered art a sacred vocation that “acknowledges a higher power” and “joyfully works as a common apprentice under God’s heaven” (p. 4).  

Great art, truthful art, weathers the winds of time and gives wings to our souls.  Indeed, Plato’s “old trinity of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty” (p. 7) retains its ancient grandeur, and nothing rivals the importance of investing one’s life in illuminating and defending transcendent realities—the “permanent things.”  Speaking personally, Solzhenitsyn noted that he survived the Gulag while thousands perished.  So he had a sacred mission:  to record, to explain, to imbed their story in literature.  Millions died because too few believed in “fixed universal human concepts called good and justice” while the oppressors disdained them as “fluid, changing, and that therefor one must always do what will benefit one’s party” (p. 220).  Sadly enough, might-makes-right philosophies forever enlist devotees; hijackers and terrorists succeed.  But despite the fact that there is much “slavery to half-cocked progressive ideas” (p. 24), one must courageously seek to refute them.      

This means refuting the “spirit of Munich” that spread cancerously throughout the West, becoming “dominant in the twentieth century.  The intimidated civilized world has found nothing to oppose the onslaught of a sudden resurgent fang-baring barbarism, except concessions and smiles.  The spirit of Munich is a disease of the will of prosperous people; it is the daily state of those who have given themselves over to a craving for prosperity in every way, to material well-being as the chief goal of life on earth” (p. 24).  He referred, of course, to the agreement Neville Chamberlain made with Adolf Hitler in 1938.  The next year Germany invaded Poland.  Even then, many Europeans sought to remain “neutral,” paralyzed by their pacifism.  This, Churchill said, was “lamentable; and it will become much worse.  . . . .  Each one hopes that if he feeds the crocodile enough, the crocodile will eat him last.  All of them hope that the storm will pass before their turn comes to be devoured.  But I fear—I fear greatly—the storm will not pass.  It will rage and it will roar, ever more loudly, ever more widely.”  

The ghastly carnage of WWII might have been avoided had Churchill’s warnings been heeded.  But neither the League of Nations nor Europe’s politicians had the courage to resist.  So it’s up to writers such as himself, Solzhenitsyn said, to speak the truth to the world.  Tyranny thrives by lies, so truth-tellers must expose and ultimately defeat the tyrants.  Writers “can VANQUISH LIES!  In the struggle against lies, art has always won and always will” (p. 33).  And so, he memorably declared:  “ONE WORD OF TRUTH OUTWEIGHS THE WORLD” (P. 34). 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Solzhenitsyn came to the world’s attention during the “Khruschev thaw” in the 1950s with his publication One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (a fictional depiction of his experience in Stalin’s prison camps) He was briefly a celebrity in his native land who was welcomed by its state-controlled literary establishment.   Before long, however, he encountered mounting governmental opposition.  So he began recording his struggles in a work entitled The Oak and the Calf:  Sketches of Literary Life in the Soviet Union (New York:  Harper Colophon Books, c. 1975).  He began by confessing:   “For the writer intent on truth, life never was, never is (and never will be!) easy” (p. 1).  Knowing this, Solzhenitsyn “entered into the inheritance of every modern Russian writer intent on the truth:  I must write simply to ensure that it was not all forgotten, that posterity might someday come to know of it” (p. 2).  He believed “the Soviet regime could certainly have been breached only by literature.”  No military coup or political movement could begin to challenge Stalin’s brutal dictatorship.  “Only the solitary writer would be able” to effectively oppose it, simply because “one word of truth outweighs the world.”  After writing The Gulag Archipelago (first published only in the West) he was expelled from Russia in 1974.  As he departed, he left behind a short, memorable message to his people:  “Live Not by Lies!”  

In exile Solzhenitsyn found refuge in the mountains of Vermont,  Initially lionized by the American intelligentsia, he was invited to deliver Harvard’s 1978 commencement address, published as A World Split Apart (New York:  Harper & Row, c. 1978).  He began his speech abrasively, noting that though Harvard’s motto is Veritas graduates would find that “truth seldom is sweet; it is almost invariably bitter” (p. 1).  And his words proved “bitter” to many!  He said, “A decline in courage may be the most striking feature that an outside observer notices in the West today,” something “particularly noticeable among the ruling and intellectual elites” (pp. 9-11).  This decline—“at times attaining what could be termed a lack of manhood”— portended a cataclysmic cultural collapse.   Then he upbraided the media.  This march of evil, he thought, gained considerable impetus from the press.  In the USSR the press was rigorously censored and obviously untrustworthy, whereas in the West it  was “free” but irresponsible and similarly untrustworthy!  Bewildered by their behavior, he thought “their fly-by-night trade” consisted mainly in trying “to outdo one another in snooping, conjecturing, and snatching at whatever they can.”  Angrily he declared:  “You are worse than the KGB!”  Throughout his years in the U.S. he disliked its media.  Rather than working hard to discover the truth, they slipped into the slothful role of circulating rumors, opinions, and “fashionable” ideas.  “Hastiness and superficiality—these are the psychic diseases of the twentieth century and more than anywhere else this is manifested in the press” (p. 27).    Consequently, “we may see terrorists heroized, or secret matters pertaining to the nation’s defense publicly revealed,” all under the “slogan ‘Everyone is entitled to know everything’” (p. 25).  Equally disturbing were American economists who lionized socialism—the very ideology that had destroyed his homeland.  This, Solzhenitsyn warned, “is a false and dangerous current” (p. 33).  In the East, “communism has suffered a complete ideological defeat; it is zero and less than zero.  And yet Western intellectuals still look at it with considerable interest and empathy, and this is precisely what makes it so immensely difficult for the West to withstand the East” (p. 55).  But capitalism in itself provides no panacea.  Both East and West, he said, need “spiritual” rather than “economic” development, and the spirit has been “trampled by the party mob in the East, by the commercial one in the West” (p. 57).   

American politicians who appeased Communism elicited Solzhenitsyn’s scorn.  In fact, looking at the nation’s withdrawal from Vietnam, he said:  “the most cruel mistake occurred with the failure to understand the Vietnam War.  Some people sincerely wanted all wars to stop just as soon as possible; others believed that the way should be left open for national, or Communist, self-determination in Vietnam (or in Cambodia, as we see today with particular clarity).  But in fact, members of the U.S. antiwar movement became accomplices in the betrayal of Far Eastern nations, in the genocide and the suffering today imposed on thirty million people there.  Do these convinced pacifists now hear the moans coming from there?  Do they understand their responsibility today?  Or do they prefer not to hear?”  To Solzhenitsyn:  “Your short-sighted politician who signed the hasty Vietnam capitulation seemingly gave America a carefree breathing pause; however a hundredfold Vietnams now looms over you” (p. 41).  He envisioned a future “fight of cosmic proportions,” a battle between the forces of either Goodness or Evil.  Those who are morally neutral, those who exalt in their moral relativism, are the true enemies of mankind.  

Cowardice explained the retreat in Southeast Asia.  Democracies, Solzhenitsyn feared, lack the necessary soul-strength for sustained combat.  Wealthy democracies seem especially flaccid.  “To defend oneself, one must also be ready to die; there is little such readiness in a society raised in the cult of material well-being.  Nothing is left, in this case, but concessions, attempts to gain time, and betrayal” (p. 45).  More deeply, the “humanism” that has increasingly dominated the West since the Renaissance explains its weakness.  When one believes ultimately only in himself, when human reason becomes the final arbiter, when human sinfulness is denied, the strength that comes only from God will dissipate.   Secular humanism he thought, is almost identical with the humanism of Karl Marx, who said:  “communism is naturalized humanism” (p. 53).  

Consequently, Solzhenitsyn said, “If the world has not approached its end, it has reached a major watershed in history, equal in importance to the turn from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance.  It will demand from us a spiritual blaze; we shall have to rise to a new height of vision, to a new level of life, where our physical nature will not be cursed, as in the Middle Ages, but even more importantly, our spiritual being will not be trampled upon, as in the Modern Era” (pp. 60-61).  This speech ended Solzhenitsyn’s speaking career in the United States.  The nation’s elite newspapers thenceforth ignored him.  Prestigious universities closed their doors.  He became something of a persona non grata and spent the last 15 years of his life in America living as a recluse, working on manuscripts devoted to Russia’s history.  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

In the years immediately prior to Solzhenitsyn’s Harvard speech, he spoke to several American and British audiences.  His speeches were published in Warning to the West (New York:  Farrar, Straus and Giroux, c. 1976).  He particularly assailed Bertrand Russell, who coined the slogan “Better Red than dead.”  To Russell and his fifth-column ilk, Solzhenitsyn replied:  “Better to be dead than a scoundrel.  In this horrible expression of Bertrand Russell’s there is an absence of all moral criteria” (p. 119).  Delivering an address over BBC in 1976, Solzhenitsyn noted that “until I came to the West myself and spent two years looking around, I could never have imagined the extreme degree to which the West actually desired to blind itself to the world situation, the extreme degree to which the West has already become a world without a will, a world gradually petrifying in the face of the danger confronting it, a world oppressed above all by the need to defend its freedom” (p. 126).  “There is a German proverb,” he continued, “which runs Mut verloren—alles verloren:  When courage is lost, all is lost.  There is another Latin one, according to which loss of reason is the true harbinger of destruction.  But what happens to a society in which both these losses—the loss of courage and the loss of reason—intersect?  This is the picture which I found the West presents today” (pp. 126-127).  

The First World War, culminating this process, virtually destroyed Europe, and in its wake the evils of socialism inundated Russia, annihilating 100 million or more of its people.   Europeans, eschewing moral criteria to follow narrowly pragmatic policies, stood by silently.  England’s prime minister, “Lloyd George actually said:  ‘Forget about Russia.  It is our job to ensure the welfare of our own society” (p. 131).  So Russia’s erstwhile “allies,” ignoring her wartime sacrifices, did nothing to stop the Bolsheviks’ tyranny and terror.  Even as millions were executed or sent into the Gulag Archipelago and six million peasants died in the Ukraine in the 1930s, Westerners ignored it.  Sadly:  “Not a single Western newspaper printed photographs or reports of the famine; indeed, your great wit George Bernard Shaw even denied its existence.  ‘Famine in Russia?’ he said.  ‘I’ve never dined so well or so sumptuously as when I crossed the Soviet border.’” (p. 133).  Similarly, during WWII the Allies benefited from Russia’s assistance, but following the war Stalin continued to oppress his people.  “Twice we helped save the freedom of Western Europe,” he said.  “And twice you repaid us by abandoning us to our slavery” (p. 136).  Frankly, he believed that Westerners preferred peace and security, pleasure and comfort, to demanding justice for Russia’s oppressed.  So they ignored the mass deportations of “whole nations to Siberia” and the occupation of the Baltic states.  Having stopped Hitler, they seared their consciences and remained untroubled with Stalin.  Indeed, rather than seriously evaluating and learning from Russia’s disaster, Western intellectuals seemed willing to replicate it!  “And what we see is always the same as it was then:  adults deferring to the opinion of their children; the younger generation carried away by shallow, worthless ideas; professors scared of being unfashionable; journalists refusing to take responsibility for the words they squander so easily; universal sympathy for revolutionary extremists; people with serious objections unable or unwilling to voice them; the majority passively obsessed by a feeling of doom; feeble governments; societies whose defensive reactions have become paralyzed; spiritual confusion leading to political upheaval” (p. 130).  

Solzhenitsyn was particularly incensed by the “misty phantom of socialism” so prevalent in places like England.  “Socialism has created the illusion of quenching people’s thirst for justice:  Socialism has lulled their conscience into thinking that a steamroller which is about to flatten them is a blessing in disguise, a salvation.  And socialism, more than anything else, has caused public hypocrisy to thrive,” enabling Europeans to ignore Soviet atrocities (p. 141).  There’s actually no logic to socialism, for “it is an emotional impulse, a kind of worldly religion,” embraced and followed with blind faith (p. 142).  As an ideology, it is spread and embraced by immature, sophistic believers.  The British had drifted toward socialism under the post-WWII Labor leaders.   Consequently, “Great Britain, the kernel of the Western world, has experienced this sapping of its strength and will to an even greater degree, perhaps, than any other country.  For some twenty years Britain’s voice has not been heard in our planet; its character has gone, its freshness has faded” (p. 144).  The land of Churchill had vanished!  “Contemporary society in Britain is living on self-deception and illusions, both in the world of politics and in the world of ideas” (p. 144).  What was true about Great Britain, he insisted, was equally true about much of the West.  

As one would anticipate, Solzhenitsyn’s BBC career ended abruptly!  Neither British nor American politicians, labor leaders, professors or journalists wanted to be rebuked for their failures!  In the 1970s, neither the United Nations nor the European Union, neither Richard Nixon nor George McGovern, neither Gerald Ford nor Jimmy Carter had the courage to oppose Communism in Southeast Asia.  Nor do numbers of their successors today seem ready to deal with the violence and injustices in the Middle East.   Let us, however, never say that no one warned us about appeasement’s desserts!

          * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Solzhenitsyn’s The Red Wheel novels include:  August 1914, which focuses on the pivotal first month of Russia’s engagement in WWI, showing why and how the Tsarist state failed to rightly respond to the conflict; November 1916, which deals with the disintegrating home front (and is the most explicitly Christian of the novels); and March 1917, which shows the government beginning to dissolve amidst the collapse of traditional authorities.  In the judgment of David Walsh:  “There is no doubt that The Red Wheel is one of the masterpieces of world literature, made all the more precious by its relevance to the tragic era through which contemporary history has passed.  Moreover, the impulse of revolutionary and apocalyptic violence associated with the age of ideology has still not ebbed.  We remain confronted by the fragility of historical existence, in which it is possible for whole societies to choose death rather than life.”

In toto, The Red Wheel constitutes what Solzhenitsyn considered “the chief artistic design of my life.”  He believed the Russian revolutions in 1917 were the crucial events of the 20th century—the cauldron of destruction still defacing the globe.  Writing the novels, Solzhenitsyn said, “there is always only one right path:  to tackle the main job.  That job will lead you to the right path of its own accord.  Tackling the job meant seeking out, for myself and for the reader, how, through our past, we can conceive of our future” (#5054).  Russian history merits our attention since it provides an important lesson regarding the fatal consequences of embracing any utopian, socialist vision for society.  Especially enlightening are passages such as one finds in November 1916, surveying the leftist movement that would finally prevail in the Bolsheviks’ triumph.  Largely responsible for that triumph was a “hapless Russian liberalism, prostrating itself, dropping its spectacles, raising its head again, throwing up its hands, urging moderation, and generally making itself a laughingstock” (p. 59).  Though feigning impartiality, Russian liberals unfailingly aligned themselves with leftist ideologies.  “Educated Russian society, which had long ago ceased to forgive the regime for anything, joyfully applauded left-wing terrorists and demanded an amnesty for all of them without exception.” (p. 59).  They fulminated against the Tsar and his government while refraining from any critique of “the revolutionary young” who had gained control of the universities and “knocked their lecturers down and prohibited academic activity.”  Students—then and now—unleash what seems to be an effluence of adolescence—“the normal sympathy of the young for the left” (p. 495).    

In a passage I’ve pondered many times—for it speaks to us today—Solzhenitsyn said:  “Just as the Coriolis effect is constant over the whole of this earth’s surface, and the flow of rivers is deflected in such as way that it is always the right bank that is eroded and crumbles, while the floodwater goes leftward, so do all the forms of democratic liberalism on earth strike always to the right and caress the left.  Their sympathies are always with the left, their feet are capable of shuffling only leftward, their heads bob busily as they listen to leftist arguments—but they feel disgraced if they take a set to or listen to a word from the right” (p. 59).  Indeed, as Lenin as other revolutionaries realized:  “The wind always blows from the far left!  No Socialist in the world could afford to ignore that fact” (p. 485).   In a 1979 interview Solzhenitsyn lamented the 1917 failures of liberals and moderate socialists in the Duma and the Provisional Government.  They lacked the courage needed to oppose the hard left—a pattern of “weakening and self-capitulation” that would be “repeated on a world-wide scale since those days.” 

It became evident with the publication of August 1914,that Solzhenitsyn was a conservative—both a Russian patriot and an Orthodox Christian—who treasured much about the “old Russia,” despite its deeply-flawed Tsarist authoritarianism.  In particular he defended Pyotr Stolypin, the Russian prime minister from 1906-1911, who had sought to bring into being a “solid class of peasant proprietors,” convinced that they could support and preserve a constitutional monarchy of some sort.  Unfortunately, Stolypin was assassinated in Kiev in 1911; he was probably the last hope for a “conservative liberal” regime that might have avoided the revolutionary chaos that subsequently ruined the nation.  In taking this position he lost support in liberal circles in both Russia and the West.  America’s Secretary of State, Henry “Kissinger for a long time prevented the Voice of America from broadcasting me, and the BBC and Radio Free Europe were also beginning to avoid me as an ‘authoritarian figure” (#4165). 

Returning to Russia in 1994 and dying in 2008, Solzhenitsyn failed to much influence developments in has native land.  And he is today largely ignored by most Westerners.  But to those with ears to hear, he remains a lasting witness to what ought ultimately concern us.  Just remember:  “ONE WORD OF TRUTH OUTWEIGHS THE WORLD” (P. 34).  Consequently:  “LIVE NOT BY LIES!” 

400 Thomas Aquinas

   Though we can never reach a consensus determining who was the “world’s smartest man,” a significant number of scholars would vote for St. Thomas Aquinas.  The “Angelic Doctor’s” genius lay not in his originality or creativity—both attributes he would have disdained—but in his unique ability to synthesize and persuasively explain the perennial truths of philosophy and theology, to effectively conjoin faith and reason.  Commending him to the Church as her finest theologian, Pope Leo XIII said:  “Because he had the utmost reverence for the Doctors of antiquity, he seems to have inherited in a way the intellect of all.”  Still more, wrote Jacques Maritain:  “St. Thomas cast his net upon the universe and carried off all things transformed into the life of the mind, towards the beatific vision.”  While in graduate school I encountered thinkers such as Maritain, and I embraced Aquinas’ “moderate realism” with its common sense Christian approach to philosophy.  I’ve read both his Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theoligica, and, as Flannery O’Connor wrote:  “I couldn’t make any judgment on the Summa, except to say this:  I read it every night before I go to bed.”  Aquinas’ love for God elicited her love for him.  Without question Aquinas is one of the handful of theologians who’ve shaped theological developments in the Christian Church.  Yet anyone who’s tried to read his Summa Theologica will testify to some difficulty in plowing through it.  Mainly this stems, I suspect, from its imposing length—several thousand pages in some editions!  

If you like sober, down-to-earth folks like Aristotle, you’ll find Thomas congenial.  He’s also congenial to those of us committed to historical Orthodoxy. Though not everyone would share the decision of the Council of Trent, placing St. Thomas’s Summa second only to the Bible as a source of theological authority, all Christians can find wellsprings of Orthodox doctrine pooled in the aquifers of Aquinas.  That Richard Hooker, drank deeply of Aquinas helps us better grasp the thought of later Anglicans such as John Wesley and C.S. Lewis.  Still more, the level of Aquinas’ thinking is far more elevated and intellectually demanding than most of us can handle  Though his thought is, in the final analysis, almost always crystal-clear, it takes patient reading and re-reading to probe the depths of reality he explores.  He’s one of the most coherent, understandable theologians, but he’s not interested in stylistic devices to entertain us!  Fortunately, Peter Kreeft, provided us a great service with his edited and annotated A Summa of the Summa:  The Essential Philosophical Passages of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica Edited and Explained for Beginners.  He selected those excerpts which best introduce the reader to the substance of St. Thomas.  To Kreeft:  “St. Thomas Aquinas is certainly one of the greatest philosophers who ever lived (to my mind he is the greatest),” giving “at least eight reasons:  truth, common sense, practicality, clarity, profundity, orthodoxy, medievalism, and modernity” (p. 11).

     Aquinas had no interest in “language games,” for the “study of philosophy,” he insisted, “is not the study of what men have opined, but of what is the truth.”  Rigorously—resolutely—he sought to see and clarify what is true, and he found truth to be down-to-earth and accessible.  He dismissed professional skeptics (whose verbal puzzles defy resolution) as misguided folks out-of-touch with an eminently touchable reality.  Ultimately, says Kreeft, “St. Thomas is important for us today precisely because of our lack.  Timeless truth is always timely, of course, but some aspects of truth are especially needed at some times, and it seems that our times badly need seven Thomistic syntheses:  (1) of faith and reason, (2) of the Biblical and the classical, the Judeo-Christian and the Greco-Roman heritages, (3) of the ideals of clarity and profundity, (4) of common sense and technical sophistication, (5) of theory and practice, (6) of an understanding, intuitive vision and a demanding, accurate logic, and (7) of the one and the many,m a cosmic unity or ‘big picture’ and carefully sorted out distinctions” (pp. 13-14).

     Encouraging the beginner to read one brief section a day, Kreeft provides helpful footnotes and a glossary of terms which enable one to develop some understanding of “Thomism.”  Though I’ve read lots of studies of Aquinas, I think Kreeft’s most helpful while digesting him. 

                  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

That Thomas Aquinas is a truly ecumenical thinker is evident in Thomas Aquinas:  An Evangelical Appraisal, by Norman L. Geisler, a prolific scholar who was widely respected by conservative evangelicals.  Geisler’s work on St. Thomas interests me because it shows how truly catholic he was, finding followers within the American “evangelicalism” Geisler and R.C. Sproul represented.   Sproul, incidentally, says of Geisler’s work:  “This is ‘must reading’ for every thinking Christian.  I am thrilled by this careful analysis of St. Thomas.”  Geisler dismissed those evangelicals such as Francis Schaeffer who disparaged Aquinas, finding them largely ill-informed.  But there was a hardy handful of evangelicals—”a strong but too often silent minority [e.g. John H. Gerstner and  R.C. Sproul] among us—who are directly dependent upon Aquinas for our basic theology, philosophy, and/or apologetics” (p. 14).  In this they imitate C.S. Lewis, finding Aquinas a fertile field for healthy theological vineyards. 

     Geisler argues there are eight contributions Aquinas can make today.  “First, Aquinas’s view of nature and interpretation of Scripture is helpful in the current debate on inerrancy and hermeneutics” (p. 21).  A Fundamentalist Aquinas was not, but he had a lofty appreciation for Scripture’s divine inspiration.  “Second, Aquinas can help us build a solid theistic basis for doing historical apologetics” (p. 21).  “Third, Aquinas, can provide a philosophical answer to the growing influence of the finite god of process theology” (p. 21).  “Fourth, Thomistic analogy seems to be the only adequate answer to the problem of religious language” (p. 22).  We must refer to God either univocally, equivocally, or analogically, and the final option is the only one suitable for Christian theology.   “Fifth, the value of Aquinas in overcoming the separation of the God of reason and revelation” (p. 22) cannot be ignored.  “Sixth, Aquinas makes a major contribution in the area of epistemology,” (p. 22), for his sophisticated distinctions between the active and passive intellects, his balanced emphasis on both empirical learning and rational thinking, provide a viable modern theory of knowledge.  “Seventh, Aquinas’s answer to the relation of faith and reason is a surprising synthesis of the best elements of rationalism and existentialism” (p. 22), for both faith and reason must be properly blended in a viable theology.  “Finally, Aquinas addresses reconciliation of human freedom and divine sovereignty . . . the nature of divine and human law . . . and the problem of evil” (p. 22).  

     After a brief discussion of Aquinas’ life and an overview of his thought, Geisler considers such subjects as “The Bible,” “Faith and Reason,” “God’s Nature,” “Evil,” and “Law and Morality.”  In my opinion, we who consider John Wesley and James Arminius our theological mentors should take note of Geisler’s appreciation for Aquinas, since in many ways he’s one of our finest forebears!  If we’re neither Calvinistic nor Pelagian when discussing the freedom of the will, we’ll find useful Thomas’ defensible middle ground.  If we believe grace perfects nature, as we suggest when we preach holiness, we side with Thomas, not Luther or Calvin.  When we rely upon the Bible as the fully-inspired Word of God, we discover it’s Thomas, not Barth or Bultmann, who guides us.  So if someone like Geisler, operating out of a thoroughly Reformed perspective, finds Aquinas worthwhile, how much more should we Wesleyans! 

                * * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

     It’s always delightful to discover an erudite scholar engaging his world with wit and wisdom.  Edward Feser teaches philosophy at Pasadena City College.  That a scholar of his caliber teaches at a community college reminds me of a remark Alexander Solzhenitsyn made when he addressed a gathering at Harvard University.  While cognizant of Harvard’s elite standing, he noted that much of the best thinking in the nation took place in non-distinguished, out-of-the-way places where individuals were not subservient to the reigning dogmas of fashion and ideology.  I’d guess he’d be delighted to find a man such as Feser working in an undergraduate college in Pasadena!  For many years he was “a convinced atheist and naturalist.”  But slowly, by carefully reading philosophers such as Gottlob Frege, he became persuaded that “there exists, in addition to the material world and the ‘world’ within the human mind, a ‘third realm’ of abstract entities, in particular of meanings and of mathematical objects like numbers.”  He then discovered, through Elizabeth Anscombe and Alasdair MacIntyre, the perennial relevance of Aristotle.  Finally, notable philosophers of religion, such as Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig whetted his appetite for St. Thomas Aquinas.   “All of this led me eventually to a serious reconsideration of the Aristotelian tradition in philosophy in general, and of Aquinas’s adaptation of it in particular, and the end result was that I became convinced that the basic metaphysical assumptions with modern secular philosophers rather unreflectively take for granted, and which alone can make atheism seem at all plausible, were radically mistaken.” 

Coupled with an appreciation for the ancient Greeks, Feser urges us to learn from Medieval thinkers such as Aquinas, the “greatest philosopher of the Middle Ages, and among the greatest philosophers, period.”   His intellectual debt to Thomas is evident in his Aquinas:  A Beginner’s Guide,  When one turns to Aquinas after reading “new atheists” such as Richard Dawkins (who failed to grasp even elementary differences between science and metaphysics), the luminous superiority of the Angelic Doctor becomes instantly apparent.  Dawkins, for example, cannot think of creation except within a linear time frame, but when Aquinas endeavored to develop arguments demonstrating God’s existence, he aimed “to show that given that there are in fact some causes of various sorts, the nature of cause and effect entails that God is necessary as an uncaused cause of the universe even if we assume that the universe has always existed and thus had no beginning.  The argument is not that the world wouldn’t have got started if God hadn’t knocked down the first domino at some point in the distant past; it is that it wouldn’t exist here and now, or undergo change or exhibit final causes here and now unless God were here and now, and at every moment, sustaining it in being, change, and goal-directedness” (The Last Superstition, p. 86).  

Aquinas held this because he grasped the difference between “accidentally ordered” and “essentially ordered” events.  The former occur as a series within time, as illustrated in the biblical lists of sons begotten by their fathers; the latter must be traced not backward but “‘downward’ in the present moment [as when a batter swings the bat, moving his hands and the bat simultaneously, the arm and shoulder and hands causing the bat to move] since they are series in which each member depends simultaneously on other members which simultaneously depend on turn on yet others, and so on” (Last Superstition, p. 93).  When we grasp this distinction, and understand that God is “Pure Act,” we can see why it is that He must, necessarily, exist.  Inasmuch as everything has an “essence”—what it is—it attains being by being actualized, deriving its existence from another, more basic Reality:  Being Itself.  “As Peter Geach puts it, for Aquinas the claim that God made the world ‘is more like “the minstrel made music” than “the blacksmith made a shoe”’; that is to say, creation is an ongoing activity rather than a once-and-for-all event.  While the shoe might continue to exist even if the blacksmith dies, the music necessarily stops when the minstrel stops playing, and the world would necessarily go out of existence if God stopped creating it” (Aquinas, p. 88).  

The natural world appears mysteriously ordered.  As Aquinas noted, “things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.”  Trees grow upward, seeking the light; arrows follow a predictable trajectory; acorns drop to the earth, ready to become lofty oaks.  In view of such manifest facts:  “It follows,” Feser says, “that the system of ends or final causes that make up the physical universe can only exist at all if there is a Supreme Intelligence or intellect outside the universe which directs things towards their ends.  Moreover, this intellect must exist here and now, and not merely at some beginning point in the past, because causes are here and now, and at any point at which they exist at all, directed towards certain ends” (Aquinas, p. 117).  Far from being a probable hypothesis, an intelligently ordered cosmos demonstrates, as Aquinas argued, the reality of an Intelligent Agent.  

Emphatically, Feser asserts:  “the classical theistic arguments, and certainly the arguments of such major philosophical theologians as Anselm, Aquinas, and Leibniz, are not properly interpreted as ‘God of the gaps’ arguments at all.  They are not ‘hypotheses’ or attempts to ‘postulate’ a quasi-scientific explanation for particular phenomena that science has not yet accounted for, but which it could in principle account for someday.  They are rather attempts conclusively to demonstrate the existence of a Necessary Being or First Cause of the world on the basis of premises (concerning the metaphysics of causation, say, or the contingency of the material world, or the concept of a greatest possible being) about which empirical science has nothing to tell us.  The question of whether they succeed or fail as proofs is thus independent of the current state of our scientific knowledge” (Philosophy Mind, pp. 236-237).  

So for Feser it’s back to Aristotle and Aquinas!  

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

To make  accessible important aspects of Aquinas’ work, Kevin Vost wrote The One Minute Aquinas:  The Doctor’s Quick Answers to Fundamental Questions.  Designed to address “the questions that matter most,” he explores some of Aquinas’ positions (primarily found in his Summa Theologica), treating the nature of human nature, God, and Christ.  We naturally desire happiness.  Exactly how to fully attain and enjoy it, however, perennially puzzles and eludes us!  Many (indeed most) of the things we pursue—wealth, pleasure, status—wrongly promise to make us happy, and even the best and brightest of mortals generally die a bit discontent.  To Aquinas this makes sense because we most deeply long for a joy impossible to attain on earth.  At best we can only partially discover (through God’s grace and a virtuous life) what we will fully attain only in heaven (the beautific vision).  We are special creatures, preeminently spiritual beings, created to share God’s eternal life, so we must rightly respond to His initiatives and commands.  

To do so requires that we comply with our divine design to live as free moral agents, to act responsibly, to do the things conducive to true happiness.  “As the intellect seeks to know the true, the will seeks to obtain the good.”  Thus we must be free, for as Thomas said, “‘Man has free will:  otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain.’”  We choose to do right or wrong, to resist or surrender to sinful temptations, to demand instant gratifications or consider long-term goods—and in making such decisions we develop the habits that shape our character.  Good habits come through sustained repetition.  “Good habits direct us toward good acts, and another word for a good habit is a virtue.   Thus we need to practice the cardinal virtues (prudence; fortitude; temperance; justice—all nicely discussed by Voss in short sections) in order to live well.  Helping us do so is the Law.  To Aquinas, “‘The light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law’” (#1229).  This law is given specificity in Scripture and informs human laws insofar as they are truly good.  

Yet we need more than the Law to guide us to eternal goodness.  Only the Grace of God grants the infused virtues (faith, hope, and love) that finally satisfy our hunger for happiness, enabling us to participate in the very life of God Himself.  Responding by faith to His invitation, we find the forgiveness of sins and are born again.  By faith we acknowledge the truth fully revealed to us in Christ and learn of Him as the Holy Spirit works within us, giving us understanding and strength to trust and follow God.  Hope grants us the assurance that our future good, our eternal happiness, has been provided by Christ’s atoning sacrifice on the Cross and Resurrection from the grave.  The best of the infused virtues, of course, is charity—“the friendship of man for God” that “resides not in our passions, but in the will, and the will desires, seeks, and loves the good.  Love in the sense of charity seeks the highest good—the attainment of union with God.”   Amazingly, God has entered into our world and encourages us to establish a lasting friendship with Him.  Just as loving our neighbors means doing good for them, as well as wishing them well, so too loving God means doing what pleases him, not simply feeling certain things about Him.  

To please God we must first know Who He Is!  To this subject Aquinas devoted himself wholeheartedly.  As a six-year old child he asked “Who is God?” and for the next 42 years he constantly sought to answer his question.  By nature we have a vague awareness of a Supreme Being of some sort, though this innate awareness easily slides into denial or forgetfulness.  We can, however, by careful thinking come to certainty regarding His existence.  Thus Aquinas set forth, at the beginning of the Summa, five famous ways to “prove” or “argue for” God’s existence.  Beyond this simple fact, we need Him to reveal Himself (primarily in Scripture) regarding his attributes, though we can reason cogently when deciding various things regarding the Great I Am who is Three-in-One.  Until quite recently, natural scientists and philosophers took the universe to be eternal.  By taking the Bible as his foundation, however, Aquinas said it was created.  Matter began to be as God spoke it into being.  Citing Dionysius, who said all things were divinely caused, Thomas said:  “God’s ability to create belongs to his being or essence, which is common to the three Persons of the Trinity.  God causes things by his intellect and will, as when a craftsman works through an idea or ‘word’ in his mind to craft something that he loves.  So too did God the Father make creatures through the Word, who is his Son, and through his Love, which is the Holy Spirit.  The Trinity, then, created creation” (#3054).  He created simply because He is Good and sought to share His goodness with His creatures.  So, as Augustine said, “the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures” and guides the studious mind toward the Creator.  

The Second Person of the Trinity, Christ Jesus, most fully revealed God to us, and Aquinas labored to fully grasp His nature and work.  With the memorable simplicity characteristic of him, he said of our Lord:  “Being born, He became our friend.  At supper, He became our food.  Dying, He was our ransom’s price.  And, reigning, is our eternal good” (#3432).    “God became incarnate as the most fitting way to restore our corrupted sinful human nature so that many good things would follow, including the building up of our faith, since we could hear God Himself speak; our hope, since Christ’s presence shows us God’s love for us; our charity, so that we would desire to love God in return for his presence among us; and our well-doing, since God himself served as our example; and indeed, ‘the full participation of the Divinity, which is the bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed on us by Christ’s humanity; for Augustine says . . . God was made man that man might be made God’” (#3467).  

Summing up his commendation of Aquinas, Vost cites the 14th century Pope John XXII, who  declared, in Doctoris Angelici:  “He enlightened the Church more than all the other Doctors together; a man can derive more profit from his books in one year than from a lifetime spent pondering the philosophy of others” (#4321).  Anyone desiring to do so will find in Kevin Vost a most helpful tutor.

# # #

399 C.S. Lewis

No 20th century thinker impacted me more than C.S. Lewis.  In this I’m not alone!  In a recent interview with Dean Nelson at Point Loma Nazarene University, NewYork Times columnist David Brooks said he received some 500 books when folks realized he was interested in Christianity.  Probably 300 of them, he said, were Mere Christianity, by Lewis!  When I was in high school one of my aunts, Edith Lantz, suggested I read Lewis, and subsequently he became a vital part of my life.  I frequently assigned Mere Christianity to classes I taught and I occasionally offered a reading seminar on Lewis.  Then I published two books on aspects of his thought—C.S. Lewis and the Bright Shadow of Holiness and C.S. Lewis Explores Vice and Virtue.  In the former I noted that when Christianity Today listed the “Movers and Shapers of Modern Evangelicalism” it said Lewis was the author whose “books indisputably affected American evangelicals during this period more than  . . . .  any of the other authors mentioned.”  In a column entitled “The Oxford Prophet,” Charles Colson called Lewis is “a true prophet for our postmodern age.”  He deserved that label, Colson said, because he was so deeply immersed in history that he could incisively critique “the narrow confines of the world-view of his own age.”  He thought and wrote from within what he called “the great body of Christian thought down the ages.”  Lewis never claimed to be more than a “lay theologian.” but he sought to clearly explain traditional Christian beliefs, and his thoroughly grounded faith informed virtually all he wrote.  His was a thoroughly converted mind! 

Lewis stood within the Natural Law tradition, as was clearly evident in the first section of Mere Christianity, entitled “On Right and Wrong as a Clue to the Meaning of the Universe” (originally a brief book consisting of 15 minute lectures he gave on BBC in 1941),  The fact that we make moral judgments points to the fact that God exists and requires righteous living.  So it’s revealing that C. S. Lewis, lecturing at the University of London, labeled himself a “middle-aged moralist,” testifying to the fact that his writings show a sustained concern for righteousness.  He thought he was called to remind us of “the primeval moral platitudes” we so routinely ignore.  He always wanted to uphold the philosophia perennis—the perennial philosophy shaped by Greek philosophers (Plato and Aristotle),  medieval theologians (Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), and Anglicans (Richard Hooker and Samuel Johnson).  These men blended moral realism, natural law, divine law, and the ethics of virtue into the central ethical tradition of Western civilization.  As his discerning contemporary Malcolm Muggeridge said, Lewis embodied integrity—a goodness “in his innermost being.  His teaching and his writing were his opus dei.”

Lewis feared that Western civilization was collapsing, so he sought to do battle for truth and justice, preserving the culture forged in Europe’s centuries-long struggle with barbarism.  In 1954 he moved from Oxford to Cambridge University, which had created a Chair of Medieval and Renaissance Literature for him.  Giving his inaugural Lecture (De Descriptione Temporum) he spoke from within what he called the “Old Western order” that significantly differed from modernity.  He was, in fact, something of a “live dinosaur” or ancient Athenian who could bear witness to distant eras.  In fact, he said, “ Ladies and gentlemen, I stand before you somewhat as that Athenian might stand.  I read as a native texts that you must read as foreigners.”  But he could prove to be a useful “specimen,” providing insight into what the “old Western men” believed.  Thus, he said, “use your specimens while you can. There are not going to be many more dinosaurs.”  That Old Western order clearly distinguished good from evil.  The modern world contained millions of people who were not more evil than folks in the past, but they increasingly refused to differentiate right from wrong, granting everyone the “right” to do what they please.  It just feels right to do so.  In the past, thinking, not feeling, set moral standards.  The “new morality” that would burst on the scene in the 1960s was a self-satisfying, feel-good morality.  To Lewis: “Out of this apparently innocent idea comes the disease that will certainly end our species (and, in my view, damn our souls) if it is not crushed; the fatal superstition that men can create values, that a community can choose its ‘ideology’ as men choose their clothes.”

Not long after delivering the BBC talks that became Mere Christianity Lewis was invited (in 1943) to give a lecture series at the University of Durham that would be titled, when published, The Abolition of Man.  It was praised by noted theologians, including Joseph Ratzinger (the future Pope Benedict XVI who noted its “keen accuracy”) and Hans Urs von Balthasar, who found its “taut brilliance” admirable.  It would be ranked among the 10 most influential non-fiction books of the 20th century by the National Review.  Having repeatedly re-read it, I consider it one of his most profound works, probably his best purely philosophical treatise, explaining much about the contemporary world. In his first lecture, “Men Without Chests,” Lewis analyzed a textbook widely used in England’s elementary schools.  It cited a well-known passage in Coleridge wherein two tourists responded differently to a waterfall; one called it “sublime” and the other found it  “pretty.”  The textbook’s authors declared:  “When the man said This is sublime, he appeared to be making a remark about the waterfall . . .   Actually . . .  he was not making a remark about the waterfall, but a remark about his own feelings.”  Truth, to the extent there is truth, is purely subjective, found within the mind rather than the external world.  Then the authors added: “This confusion is continually present in language as we use it.  We appear to be saying something very important about something: and actually we are only saying something about our own feelings.”  But Lewis insisted:  “Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence or our contempt.  The reason why Coleridge agreed with the tourist who called the cataract sublime and disagreed with the one who called it pretty was of course that he believed inanimate nature to be such that certain responses could be more ‘just’ or ‘ordinate’ or ‘appropriate’ to it than others.  And he believed (correctly) that the tourists thought the same.  The man who called the cataract sublime was not intending simply to describe his own emotions about it: he was also claiming that the object was one which merited those emotions.”  

Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas all agreed:  a rightly educated person learns to see what’s good or true or beautiful in what we perceive.   In the moral life, Lewis said, there is what the Chinese call the Tao.  “It is Nature, it is the Way, the Road.  It is the Way in which the universe goes on, the Way in which things everlastingly emerge, stilly and tranquilly, into space and time.  It is also the Way which every man should tread in imitation of that cosmic and supercosmic progression, conforming all activities to that great exemplar.  ‘In ritual’, say the Analects, ‘it is harmony with Nature that is prized.’  The ancient Jews likewise praise the Law as being ‘true’.  This conception in all its forms, Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental alike, I shall henceforth refer to for brevity simply as ‘the Tao.’”  These great ethical traditions share a commitment to “objective value, the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are.”  They have been variously called the Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes. They were set forth by some “wise men of old” whose main concern was “to conform the soul to reality, and the solution had been knowledge, self-discipline, and virtue.”   It’s the Tao, and it’s “not one among a series of possible systems of value.  It is the sole source of all value judgements.  If it is rejected, all value is rejected.  If any value is retained, it is retained.  The effort to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-contradictory. There has never been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value in the history of the world.”  The architects of these traditions believed in the propagation of received wisdom, whereas the modern educators—the “innovators” in Lewis’s view—engaged in propaganda that produces “Men without Chests.”  Sadly, Lewis concluded:  “In a sort of ghastly simplicity we remove the organ and demand the function.  We make men without chests and expect of them virtue and enterprise.  We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst.  We castrate and bid the geldings be fruitful.”

Embracing this modern philosophy of education would, in the long run, destroy society.  Without objective values widely acknowledged and followed there would be the cascading chaos of everyone doing whatever feels good.  And indeed, within 30 years young folks—the ‘60s generation—spoke for the counterculture by declaring “if it feels good do it!”  It’s not what’s good that I want—it’s what I want that’s good!  Such persons would be promoting, Lewis predicted in his third lecture, “The Abolition of Man.”  Without adhering to the Tao, people would differ in their views of what is truly “good,” and inevitably those with power would tell others what to do.  In our increasingly technological world (a world Lewis disliked in many ways) the machines empower their developers.  As we impose our wills on Nature, and “if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized,” the result will be “the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men.”  Tragically:  “Human nature will be the last part of Nature to surrender to Man.  The battle will then be won.”

Writing these lectures Lewis could not have foreseen the success of today’s transgender advocates.  Men not only claim to be women but are supported by powerful cultural institutions in so doing!  They have repudiated the very notion of human nature!  But Lewis asserted:  “Either we are rational spirit obliged for ever to obey the absolute values of the Tao, or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes for the pleasures of masters who must, by hypothesis, have no motive but their own `natural’ impulses.  Only the Tao provides a common human law of action which can over-arch rulers and ruled alike.  A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not slavery.”  And though dictators and totalitarian regimes illustrate this quite clearly Lewis warned that:   “many a mild-eyed scientist in pince-nez, many a popular dramatist, many an amateur philosopher in our midst, means in the long run just the same as the Nazi rulers of Germany.  Traditional values are to be `debunked’ and mankind to be cut out into some fresh shape at the will (which must, by hypothesis, be an arbitrary will) of some few lucky people in one lucky generation which has learned how to do it.” 

Only a recovery of the Tao, only a restoration of traditional values, can save us from tyranny and destruction.  As of now the folks Lewis feared are in control of our world, creating the chaos portrayed in his dystopian novel, That Hideous Strength.  

                                    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

In The Problem of Pain C.S. Lewis set forth persuasive philosophical answers to human suffering.  But when his wife Joy died he had to deal with it in a deeply personal way.  He recorded his struggles in some notebooks that were later published as A Grief Observed (San Francisco:  HarperSanFrancisco, c. 1961, 1996).  His words helped me deal with my own grief; I have re-read the book many times and recommended it to others, for it more accurately describes what I’ve felt than anything I’ve read or can say.  In his “Introduction” to the book, Lewis’s step-son, Douglas Gresham, notes:  “This book is a man emotionally naked in his own Gethsemane.  It tells of the agony and the emptiness of a grief such as few of us have to bear, for the greater the love the greater the grief, and the stronger the faith the more savagely will Satan storm the fortress” (p. xxvi).  Pious rhetoric fails in such moments, and Jesus’ words on the Cross—“My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me”—sound more truthful than “God is good, all the time”!  

 “Meanwhile, where is God?” Lewis wondered.  “This is one of the most disquieting symptoms” (p. 5).   If he’d hoped God would emotionally embrace and comfort him, such was not the case.  “Talk to me about the truth of religion and I’ll listen gladly.  Talk to me about the duty of religion and I’ll listen submissively.  But don’t come talking to me about the consolations of religion or I shall suspect that you don’t understand” (p. 25). “What chokes every prayer and every hope is the memory of all the prayers H. [referring to Joy] and I offered and all the false hopes we had” (p. 30).  “Kind people have said to me, ‘She is with God.’  In one sense that is most certain.  She is, like God, incomprehensible and unimaginable” (p. 24).  Perhaps, Lewis thought, “If H. ‘is not,’ then she never was.  I mistook clouds of atoms for a person” (p. 28).  But he could never confuse mind with molecular motion, agreeing with a great neuroscientist, John Eccles, who said:  “We are spiritual beings with souls in a spiritual world, as well as material beings with bodies and brains existing in a material world” (p. 29). 

An unexpected consequence of his suffering, Lewis noted, is “the laziness of grief” (p. 5).   Indeed:  “Reality, looked at steadily, is unbearable” (p. 28).  “And grief still feels like fear.  Perhaps, more strictly, like suspense.  Or like waiting; just hanging about waiting for something to happen.  It gives life a permanently provisional feeling.  It doesn’t seem worth starting anything.  I can’t settle down.  I yawn, I fidget, I smoke too much.  Up till now I always had too little time.  Now there is nothing but time.  Almost pure time, empty successiveness” (p. 33).  “The agonies, the mad midnight moments, must, in the course of nature, die away, but what will follow?” he wonders.  “Just this apathy, this dead flatness?  . . . .  Does grief finally subside into boredom tinged by faint nausea?” (p. 36).  It’s enervating.  There’s a strange ennui, a disinterest in doing anything beyond necessary daily tasks.   

Lewis often wondered at the mysterious one-flesh nature of Christian marriage.  Male and female are, by nature, somewhat at odds.  “Marriage heals this.  Jointly the two become fully human.  ‘In the image of God created he them.’  Thus, by a paradox, this carnival of sexuality leads us out beyond our sexes.  And then one or other dies” (p. 49).    There is a literal truth to this conjugal union that one realizes when the bond is broken and part of you departs.  So:  “There’s a limit to the ‘one flesh.’  You can’t really share someone else’s weakness, or fear or pain” (p. 13).  Only Joy had to suffer the interminable treatments.  Only she knew the inescapable depression of unanswered prayers and failed procedures.  “I had my miseries,” he said, “not hers; she had hers, not mine.  The end of hers would be the coming-of-age of mine.  We were setting out on different roads” (p. 13).  Different roads:  hers to Glory; his through Gethsemane.  

“If, as I can’t help suspecting,” Lewis says, “the dead also feel the pains of separation (and this may be one of their purgatorial sufferings), then for both lovers, and for all pairs of lovers without exception, bereavement is a universal and integral part of our experience of love.  It follows marriage as normally as marriage follows courtship or as autumn follows summer.  It is not a truncation of the process but one of its phases; not the interruption of the dance, but the next figure.  We are ‘taken out of ourselves’ by the loved one while she is here.  Then comes the tragic figure of the dance in which we must learn to be still taken out of ourselves through the bodily presence is withdrawn, to love the very Her and not fall back to loving our past, or our memory, or our sorrow, or our relief from sorrow, or our own love” (p. 50).  How helpful this is!  To imagine that separation is but another step in the dance of love—a process divesting one of self-absorption while focusing (primarily through grief) upon the lover—is worth pondering.  Lewis also wondered about the sanctifying aspects Joy’s suffering, when “month by month and week by week you broke her body on the wheel while she wore it” (p. 42).  “The more we believe that God hurts only to heal, the less we can believe that there is any use in begging for tenderness” (43).  He then compared God to a loving surgeon who insists on operating, at considerable pain to the patient, in order to ultimately heal.  Nothing is more helpful (if hard to accept) than this:  God wills our good—our holiness—and certain processes, sickness and death included, contribute to this good. 

Implicit in the well-intended but usually unwelcome “how are you doing?” inquiries is the assumption that you must soon “get over” the loss of your loved one.  As Lewis notes, “the words are ambiguous.  To say a patient is getting over it after an operation for appendicitis is one thing; after he’s had his leg cut off is quite another.  After that operation either the wounded stump heals or the man dies.  If it heals, the fierce, continuous pain will stop.  Presently he’ll get his strength back and be able to stump about on his wooden leg.  He has ‘got over it.’  But he will probably have recurrent pains in the stump all his life, and perhaps pretty bad ones; and he will always be a one-legged man.  There will be hardly any moment when he forgets it” (p. 52).  Lewis then notes the various things one continues to do while constantly sensing the loss of the limb.  “All sorts of pleasures and activities that he once took for granted will have to be simply written off.  Duties too.  At present I am learning to get about on a wooden leg.  But I shall never be a biped again” (p. 53).  What powerful analogies Lewis employs!  Many of us describe the loss of a spouse as an amputation.  But only Lewis has the skill to flesh out the comparison so as to enable one to see this.  “I shall never be biped again.”  How lamentably true.  

In time, Lewis sensed how rightly remembering his wife pointed him to God.  He had no “good” pictures of Joy, but at times he thought of her as a sword, because of her sharp mind.  At other times he compared her to a lush, nurturing garden.  “Thus up from the garden to the Gardener, from the sword to the Smith.  To the life-giving Life and the Beauty that makes beautiful” (p. 63).   Ultimately:  “All reality is iconoclastic.  The earthly beloved, even in this life, incessantly triumphs over your mere idea of her.  And you want her to; you want her with all her resistances, all her faults, all her unexpectedness.  That is, in her foursquare and independent reality.  And this, not any image or memory, is what we are to love still, after she is dead” (p. 66).  Lewis interrogated himself, wondering if he loved Joy more than God or craved to see her more than Him hereafter.  He knew he must prefer God above all in order to attain his final end.  So he asked:  “Lord, are these your real terms?  Can I meet H. again only if I learn to love you so much that I don’t care whether I meet her or not?  Consider, Lord, how it looks to us” (p. 68).  He then noted that “Just as if, on earth, I could have cured her cancer by never seeing her again, I’d have arranged to never see her again.  I’d have had to.  Any decent person would” (p. 69).  That’s because, if the Gospel is true, Joy was alive and well, as never before, and he must rest content with the knowledge that her being is ever sustained by the “One in whom we live and move and have our being.”  

Describing one of his sudden awakenings to his late wife’s persisting presence, Lewis said:  “It’s the quality of last night’s experience—not what it proves but what it was—that makes it worth putting down.  It was incredibly unemotional.  Just the impression of her mind momentarily facing my own, not ‘soul’ as we tend to think of soul.  . . . .  Not at all like a rapturous reunion of lovers.  . . . .  Not that there was any ‘message’—just intelligence and attention.  No sense of joy or sorrow.  No love even in our ordinary sense.  No un-love.  I had never in any mood imagined the dead as being so—well, so business-like.  Yet there was an extreme and cheerful intimacy.  An intimacy that had not passed through the senses at all” (p. 73).  “Wherever it came from, “Lewis continued, “it has made a sort of spring cleaning in my mind.  The dead could be like this; sheer intellects” (p. 74).  He found he didn’t need emotional comfort.  “The intimacy was complete—sharply bracing and restorative too—without it” (p. 74).  Rather than being the nebulous, ethereal spirits portrayed in New Age materials, the departed are:  “Above all, solid.  Utterly reliable.  Firm.  There is no nonsense about the dead” (p. 75).  Indeed!  How good it is to imagine our departed loved ones as the substantial figures portrayed in Lewis’s incomparable The Great Divorce. 

# # #

398 Is Religion Obsolete?  

In the final pages of The Everlasting Man, G.K. Chesterton noted that Christianity is quite unique inasmuch as it has died several times and then, mysteriously, risen again.  “Christendom has had a series of revolutions and in each one of them Christianity has died.  Christianity has died many times and risen again; for it had a god who knew the way out of the grave.  But the first extraordinary fact which marks this history is this:  that Europe has been turned upside down over and over again; and that at the end of each of these revolutions the same religion has again been found on top.  The Faith is always converting the age, not as an old religion but as a new religion.”   At least “three or four times” in Church history “the whole soul seemed to have gone out of Christianity; and almost every man in his heart expected its end.”  Whether studying the Arians or the French skeptics, the Albigensians or the Darwinists, “the Faith has to all appearance gone to the dogs.”  But every time it was the dogs who died!  

“This is the final fact,” Chesterton wrote, “and it is the most extraordinary of all.  The faith has not only often died but it has often died of old age.  It has not only been often killed but it has often died a natural death; in the sense of coming to a natural and necessary end.”  Sometimes the death came violently, under intense persecutions.  “But it has a more strange and even a more weird tenacity; it has survived not only war but peace.  It has not only died often but degenerated often and decayed often; it has survived its own weakness and even its own surrender. “  It has survived because it is the bride of the Risen Lord Jesus, Who promised:  “‘Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.’”  The ancient and medieval worlds have passed away.  Modernity may well be dying now and carrying Christendom with it.  But, Chesterton said, let not your heart be troubled!  The future may be surprisingly Christian—just not in the way we might imagine it.

Without forgetting Chesterton’s insights, we can now take seriously the plight of today’s Western Christian Church without losing hope in the ultimate triumph of her Redeemer.  While reading the latest sociological study by Christian Smith—Why Religion Went Obsolete:  The Demise of Traditional Faith in America (New York:  Oxford University Press, c. 2025; Kindle Edition)—it’s important to remember such studies are snapshots of a current situation, not conclusive laments for a lost supernatural reality.  The data prove, Smith says, that “Americans have lost faith in traditional religion” (p. 1).  “Until the 1990s, traditional American religion appeared in many ways to be alive and well.”  Europe might have lost the Faith, but it thrived in America.  “No longer.  The tide has turned.  Crucially, these religious losses are concentrated among younger generations, which means that—barring unlikely religious revivals among youth—the losses will not just continue but accelerate as less-religious younger Americans replace older more-religious ones and fewer and fewer American children are raised by religious parents” (p. 1).  These trends are especially evident in mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic churches.

The rapid loss of religious faith is the result of a cluster of “sociocultural developments” that have made traditional religion irrelevant and obsolete, says Smith, a professor of sociology at the University of Notre Dame, who excels in cranking out and analyzing the kinds of studies prescribed by his profession.  His data document what many of us have observed on a personal level—churches declining or closing, schools collapsing, anti-Christian polemicists and movements gaining traction.  The failure of the churches to appeal to young people is also quite evident.   Gen X (born 1965–1980) proved to be “the transitional hinge of cultural and religious change, breaking with the old order and signaling new directions.”  Millennials accelerated the process, and “Gen Z (born 1997–2012) is now carrying forward and working out the details of the new normal” (p. 12).  No matter how you measure it, younger people find religion less essential than their grandparents.  They may think religion is good if it encourages morality or psychological health or community service, but they don’t think it reveals any kind of Transcendent Truth.  Indeed, they seem uninterested in their souls’ condition or destination. 

Young people are, in fact, shaped by their culture.  Much that they think is scarcely reflective, much less logical.  The culture of relativism (famously identified by Pope Benedict XVI) now dominates their world.  It’s the zeitgeist within which they function—a worldview fed by a variety of cultural developments that seem to have little immediate bearing on religion.   Identifying these developments makes Smith’s work most valuable.  They include, first, “higher education for the masses.”  The more highly educated you are the less you will find religion necessary.  Statistically, college students turn away from their parents’ faith. Secondly, women entering the work force tended to take religion less seriously.  Thirdly, there was a serious erosion of traditional marriage and family.  Until the ‘70s “cohabitation was practically nonexistent,” but now it’s “not uncommon and largely accepted by the cultural mainstream” (p. 78).  Fourth, younger folks rarely join fraternal and civic organizations.  They’re less likely to join a church or civic club or a bowling league.  Fifth, they are embedded in a mass consumption culture, continually shopping and buying things.  Sixth, they’re poster children for “expressive individualism,” forever seeking “personal authenticity.”  To think of yielding one’s life to another person—or to an Ultimate Person—violates their desire for autonomy.  Seventh, they clearly have embraced much of postmodernism, including its epistemological skepticism and ethical relativism.  Eighth, they identify as “emerging adults” rather than fully formed grown-ups.  The data show significant numbers of them still living with their parents rather than setting up independent households.  

Smith thinks the year 1991—the end of the Cold War—marked  the beginning of religion’s collapse.  “The victory over godless communism that America and the West had achieved ‘by the grace of God’ would, ironically, result in an America with much less interest in God.  The end of the Cold War was a jolt that helped to trigger the cultural avalanche that plowed over religion in the next two decades” (p. 129).  A “new world order” emerged, establishing a “neoliberal capitalism” that required young folks to totally give themselves to careers.  This frequently meant going where the jobs were and leaving their childhood communities.  Working only for themselves, constantly competing to succeed, they were caught up in a very irreligious economic system.  Simultaneously they were immersed and in danger of drowning in the digital revolution.  Smith’s analysis of the impact of this revolution is perceptive and alarming, for it underlies many of the problems churches must confront.  The internet and cell phones transformed the culture in manifold ways, demanding large amounts of time and creating a virtual world that easily replaced the real one.  Contact with actual persons declined, as did attending religious services.  As one young person said:  “‘The reason for religion’s decline is pretty basic:  technology.  Our focus is just gone’” (p. 145).  

No sooner had the Cold War ended than a new war—a war on terror—erupted.  On September 11, 2001, militant Muslims destroyed the World Trade Towers in New York City and the world changed.  Unexpectedly, religion also changed, since Americans’ evaluations of religion shifted from seeing it as generally good to fearing it as a vehicle of violence.  Then an influential corps of “new atheists” persuaded their followers that all religions, Christianity as well as Islam, are by nature violent.   During the same decade a “third sexual revolution” challenged the traditional religions, normalizing non-marital activities.  Young women especially celebrated their freedom to be promiscuous, enjoying “friends with benefits” and “booty calls.”  Homosexual activities also gained significant social approval.  In 2001 a majority of Americans disapproved same-sex relationships, but by 2008 the tides had turned and a majority approved them.  By 2022 some 71% of the people found them “morally acceptable.”  By 2016, when the Supreme Court approved same sex marriage, a majority of Americans agreed.  Millennials especially support the LGBTQ+ agenda.  They also believe in and fear global warming.  Many suffer “climate grief” or “environmental nihilism.  Some have abandoned hope for the future, even despairing at bringing children into the world.  “An astounding 33% of Millennials believe that ‘Humanity is doomed,’ while 28% report that they feel a huge amount or a lot of ‘sadness, fear, anxiety, or anger over the climate crisis’” (p. 211).   

Amidst these developments during the initial decades of the 21st century, young Americans showed less and less respect for traditional religion.  Though  religion may have helped their parents be morally upright, they think it’s quite easy to be “good without God.”   Harvard University’s humanist chaplain, Greg Epstein, laid out this claim in a pivotal book entitled Good Without God:  What a Billion Nonreligious People Do Believe.  Though the standards for goodness were quite low, “The insistence that people can be moral without religion was one of the most pervasive in our interviews.  A small sample:  ‘I found comfort going to church and learning things, but it’s not spiritually supportive of me anymore’” (p. 221).  A young woman felt “annoyed by the Ten Commandments“ inasmuch as she finds equally valid prescriptions in her own heart.  She, along with many of her generation, prefer to think of themselves as “spiritual” rather than religious and often join  the growing crowd of “nones” identifying as having no religion.  

Compounding the growing disaffiliation from traditional religions are an assortment of self-destructions littering the ecclesiastical scene.  “Beginning in the late 1980s, scores of public scandals rocked religious communities as religious leaders were exposed for having committed various sexual, financial, and other wrongdoings.  For more than two decades, scandals touched almost every religious tradition in the United States, demoralizing the faithful and disgracing leaders” (p. 229).  Horrendous sexual misbehavior (largely involving priests and young men) rocked the Roman Catholic Church.  Protestants and Jews suffered similar revelations.   Famous leaders were exposed, including Jean Vanier, the Catholic founder of L’Arche, who engaged in multiple sexual trysts, and John Howard Yoder, an influential Anabaptist theologian, who “sexually harassed, abused, and assaulted” some 100 women.  As Smith comments:  “The contrast between Yoder’s compelling call for Christian nonviolence and his practice of sexual abuse was stunning” (p. 240).  These seemingly endless scandals certainly played a major role in disillusioning anyone seriously considering religious claims, many of whom headed for church exits.

Winding up his presentation, Smith lists 34 items explaining the growing obsolescence of religion.  Many of them can be reduced to the Millennials’ widespread expressive individualism—everyone is unique, everyone must be celebrated, everyone’s values must be respected.  Self-awareness and self-development are highly prized.  You must constantly develop your self and resist any effort of others or (especially) institutions such as churches to shove you into a mold.  Only you know and can appropriate the truths that are right for you.  Live for the day.   YOLO—“you only live once.”  If religion helps you in your development embrace it.  But don’t dare suggest it’s valuable for others—and, above all, don’t be judgmental.  Summing up (with myself adding bold face to the main points):  “In heart and soul, as a matter of deep culture, the Millennial zeitgeist was (and seems to remain):  Immanent:  Focused on the here and now, not the transcendent or otherworldly; Individualistic:  Envisioning society as a collection of atomistic, choice-making selves;  Anti-institutional:  Avoiding structured social groups and institutions;  Presentist:  Captive to the contemporary, unmoored from history and tradition;  Relativist:  Viewing knowledge, truth, and ethics as opinions dependent on perspectives;  Distrustful:  Suspicious of most people’s and organization’s motives and agendas; Subjectivist:  Assuming interior feelings and experience to be the best guides for living; Anti-authority:  Hostile to structured social roles of influence and power;  Fluid: Expecting change, instability, revision, mobility; Multicultural:  Comfortable with sociocultural diversity, dubious of homogenous groups; Minimalist:  Preferring to strip away unnecessary systems, particularities, creeds;  Transgressive:  Breaking down received boundaries, norms, categories, decorum; Pornographic:  Inundated by images of nudity, sex, and violence of all sorts in most media; Jaded:  Bored by hype and defeated by disappointment, scandals, and dim futures; Consumerist:  Conceiving the good life as continually acquiring new experiences and products; Entertained:  Soaking up relentless stimulation, amusement, performance, spectacle; Re-enchanted:  Open to believing “weird” stuff that enlightened modernity had suppressed” (p. 336).  Dealing with this zeitgeist, Smith acknowledges that churches find themselves in “no-win situations.  When religion seriously accommodated pluralism, it became milquetoast.  When it proclaimed a distinctive message, it was narrow-minded” (p. 367).  

Reading Smith’s treatise, I was impressed with his wide-ranging scholarship and commitment to making clear the state of religion in America.  Yet it seems to me it is as much a commentary on our culture as our religion.  We need to recognize, as Alistair MacIntyre insisted in After Virtue, that we are witnessing the triumph of barbarism.  Thus there is an alarming decline in the quality or education—as pointed out by in Every One Must Have a Prize, by Melanie Phillips.  There is a similar decline of standards in music and art.  Smith certainly acknowledges that the obsolescence of religion has taken place in a withering culture, but much apart from the church has also become obsolete.  Classical languages, meaningful grammar, literary masterpieces, and logic share that demise.  

                                                      * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

That religion may, in fact, not be obsolete is evident in Charles A. Murray’s recent Taking Religion Seriously (New York:  Encounter Books, c. 2025; Kindle Edition).  Murray is a controversial political scientist well-known for such treatises as Losing Ground and The Bell Curve.  He made headlines when he was Invited to speak in Middlebury College in 2017.  Students protested and prevented him from delivering his speech.  He then made a video of the address and tried to leave the campus, only to be physically attacked by protesters.  Though he was not injured, a professor accompanying him was seriously injured, suffering a concussion.  A committed libertarian, Murray was, for much of his life, a religious skeptic.  Then his wife, overwhelmed by the beauty of bearing a child, developed an interest in a world rooted in something bigger than herself.  “Her epiphany was that she loved [her daughter] Anna ‘far more than evolution required’” (p. 7).  That led her to link up with The Society of Friends (Quakers) and cultivate a more spiritual life.  Her interests prodded Murray to become more open-minded to religious claims, and this brief book charts his journey during the past two decades.

Though he attended a Presbyterian church as a child, Murray abandoned any religious life while earning degrees from Harvard and MIT.  Without serious thought he simply embraced what he calls “Western modernity” with its deeply irreligious assumptions.  He now knows that these assumptions were unreflective and deeply flawed.  “I had not investigated the factual validity any of those propositions.  They were part of the received wisdom of most Western intellectuals throughout the twentieth century.  I accepted them without thinking” (p. 22).  He assumed science had rendered belief in God irrational, that earth is a tiny speck in a vast universe, and man is simply a sophisticated animal.  No enlightened thinker believed in the soul and there was certainly no life beyond the grave.  “The great religious traditions are human inventions,” Murray believed, “natural products of the fear of death.  That includes Christianity, which can call on no solid evidence for its implausible claims” (p. 21).  But late in life —in the 1990s—he started to question these assumptions, beginning with the eerie conjunction of mathematics and Reality demonstrated by thinkers such as Newton, Boyle, and Einstein.  “The relationship of mathematics to reality has generated shelves of books of which I was entirely ignorant (and remain nearly so).  But even at my elementary level, it just seemed extremely odd that so many basic phenomena were so mathematically simple. It was almost as if someone had planned it that way” (p. 23).  If so, who is that someone?  He also began to appreciate the importance of human consciousness, the possibility that we have souls.  Strict materialists cannot explain the way we think.  Though great advances have been made in understanding the brain, there is something more than matter-in-motion when we think.  Perhaps, he came to see, there is a non-material realm to our awareness of our world.  

Then a friend of his, Charles Krauthammer, asked him, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”  Though this is a truly ancient philosophical question, Murray had never seriously pondered it!  He’d never read Plato and Augustine, Aristotle and Aquinas!  “When I had thought about the existence of the universe at all, I had taken it as a given.”  Case closed!  But perhaps not!  The more he actually thought about it the more he took “the issue seriously.  Why is there anything?  Surely things do not exist without having been created.  What created all this?  If you haven’t thought about it recently, this is a good time to stop and try to come up with your own answer” (p. 24).  Perhaps there is, as Aristotle said, an “unmoved Mover.”  Next, coming to terms with the scientific evidence for a moment of singularity, he began studying current materials regarding the “big bang.”  Literally, in a milli-second, everything came into being.  “Sometime in the early 2000s,” says Murray, “I did have a road-to-Damascus moment, but it was empirical rather than spiritual.  I decided that the entity that I might as well call God had deliberately designed the universe to permit the existence of life.  It was a case of reading a relatively small number of pages of text and saying to myself, “I can’t believe I’m thinking this, but it’s the only plausible explanation” (p. 29).  He had to rethink everything.  While pondering the evidence presented in a book titled Just Six Numbers, he concluded he “had no choice” but to acknowledge “that a God created a universe that would enable life to exist” (p. 44).  

Intellectually persuaded that God exists, Murray began to consider Christianity.  He’d already been impressed by great Christian thinkers and artists while writing Human Accomplishment, published in 2003.  Fortuitously, two years later an Evangelical friend suggested he read C.S. Lewis’s classic Mere Christianity, which helped him move from acknowledging a transcendent Moral Law to accepting its Author.  Strengthening his case, in The Abolition of Man, “Lewis discusses how the Moral Law raises an issue that cuts across religions and philosophic systems:  the doctrine of objective value, “the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and the kind of things we are” (p. 148).  That we can’t construct our own morality seemed manifestly true. Trying to do so had collapsed our culture.   “I was born in 1943,” he says, “and have witnessed 180-degree flips in the secular received wisdom on child-rearing, marriage, divorce, euthanasia, abortion, acceptable public behavior, responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions, and virtually everything about human sexuality.  Many of these changes do not appear to have been for the better.  Doesn’t the evanescence of moral principles in the present age suggest a special need to seek moral bedrock?” (p. 151).  There is, of course, a lengthy list of thoughtful folks who have been intellectually challenged and moved by the works of Lewis.  Murray is simply one of the latest, and notably prominent, thinkers to acknowledge him.

Subsequently, Murray began to consider the truthfulness of the Gospels, which he’d earlier considered fictional.  It became clear to him that the “lives of Jesus” constructed by biblical critics revealed much about themselves but not much about Jesus.  The more he studied the primary texts in the New Testament the more he came to believe in their accuracy.  He devoured a great historical work, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses:  The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony, by Richard Bauckham, and came to share his high regard for the authenticity and trustworthiness of the New Testament.  Miracles, especially Christ’s Resurrection, became credible.  This didn’t make him a believer, but it did establish a solid foundation for belief.  

He’s still a seeker, but he’s come to believe that much that religion holds may very well be true.